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Chapter 1. Introduction  
 
The Dialogue and Dissent Theory of Change takes the starting point that CSOs can contribute to inclusive 
and sustainable development. Articulating and communicating the voice of the people, they can address 
important inequalities in society. In our research, we relate to five (implicit and explicit) assumptions in 
the Dialogue and Dissent Theory of Change regarding this representative role of CSOs. These 
assumptions all concern the nature of the representative role of CSOs and how these are shaped in 
interactions between CSOs, in the contexts in which they move and operate. Firstly, we relate to the 
assumption that CSOs represent societal groupings and interests and thereby can contribute to inclusive 
development. Secondly, we relate to the assumption that collaborations with Northern NGOs and 
donors contribute to the enabling of representative roles for Southern CSOs. Thirdly, we relate to the 
assumption that CSOs requires autonomy and ownership to perform their representative roles. Fourthly, 
we engage with the assumption that different types of CSO have different and complementary 
representative roles. Finally, we relate to the assumption that the strengthening of civil society’s 
representative roles will contribute to inclusive and sustainable development. 
All these assumptions, while diverse in nature, express hopes and aspirations about the role of CSOs. 
While the Theory of Change does problematize some key dimensions of the assumptions, it appears to 
be still limited in its engagement with the complex dynamics in which CSOs find themselves, when it 
comes to the shaping of representative roles.  
In our understanding, the above assumptions deserve to be unpacked further and insights on them 
deepened and in some aspects, possibly challenged. First, there are many different ways in which CSOs 
constitute their representative role, from different understandings of who and how to represent, with 
what aims. Moreover, relevant diversities within contexts will shape the representative roles of different 
CSOs differently. In many cases, CSOs represent sections of society from highly specific ideological and 
organisational backgrounds. For example, knowledge-based organisations offering expertise on disaster 
risk reduction may represent interests of what they would call ‘vulnerable’ or ‘marginal’ people, but in 
ways highly different from rights-based advocates. The way representation takes shape, through social 
construction of groupings and representation itself, will have important implications for inclusiveness. 
Importantly, CSOs’ forms of representation that we will find will be at least partly shaped by the 
inequalities in society itself – raising the question how this figures in the way inequalities are countered 
through representative roles. Secondly, often CSOs are domestically embedded in multiple relations, 
collaborations and contexts. This has important implications for the way CSOs give shape to their role, 
complementing those of others, defining themselves in relations with others, and seeing themselves 
defined by others, including e.g. partners, opposing forces and the state. This embedding also has 
implications for autonomy and ownership, and thereby for the nature of representation. Thirdly, within 
the complexity of multiple relations and embeddedness in context, the role of collaboration with donors 
and Northern CSOs will be relative in nature.  
By our research, we seek to deepen insights regarding collaboration focusing on Southern CSOs’ 
navigation of possibilities while shaping their representative roles, doing justice to the organizational 
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and contextual realities in which CSOs find themselves. This perspective relates directly to current 
debate in international development. Increasingly, development actors seek ways to help make sure 
that development is owned by people and organisations ‘on the ground’. This also goes for the 
representative role of CSOs. A long term goal we find emerging in the field is to create conditions where 
responsibilities and leadership increasingly lie with Southern CSOs (Banks et al., 2015; Miller-Dawkins, 
2017; Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2018; Goodman, 2016; Forsch, 2018). 
This implies that development actors like donors and Northern CSOs seeking to support the 
representative roles of CSOs in the Global South, will, more than before, need to take the perspectives 
and context of Southern CSOs as leading in the development of collaboration efforts. However, we 
believe that as yet, it is unclear what that would mean in practice, when it comes to fundamental 
questions: whom to work with, how to collaborate, and what this implies for roles of donors and 
Northern CSOs.  
If Southern CSOs are to be more leading, their contexts, understandings and ambitions move more to 
the centre of programmes and collaborations. Here is where our research seeks to contribute. We take 
the perspectives that CSOs will be navigating the possibilities of their representative roles as agents, 
from their own perspectives, strategies and choices in engaging with opportunities and constraints. 
Different collaborations may or may not strengthen their roles, from their perspectives, and the nature 
and added value of donors and Northern CSOs’ involvement cannot be taken as given. We focus on the 
ways that representative roles come to take shape in the complex realities of collaboration, in context, 
and with what implications for CSOs’ roles advancing inclusive and sustainable development. We do this 
because, with agendas and roles less predefined by Northern donors and CSOs, questions of who gets 
represented, and how, come to the fore as open-ended yet crucial.  
Our objective is to contribute to a guiding framework for donors and CSOs seeking to contribute to the 
representative role of CSOs in the global South in order to advance inclusive and sustainable 
development while ‘starting from the South’. In order to help make ‘starting from the South’ possible, 
we focus on deepening understandings that can help make that move possible: understandings of the 
nature of different representative roles; of contextually relevant diversities; pf the relative role of 
different collaborations and relations, and context. We focus on the way organisations in the South 
navigate the possibilities of their representative roles and the way collaboration shapes these roles, in 
order to inform the way donors and Northern CSOs can in turn better navigate the possibilities of 
collaboration from their side.  
We focus on India as an example where the issues raised above arise and need to be addressed for 
collaborations to be meaningful contributions to CS representative roles that can contribute to inclusive 
and sustainable development. This by no means implies that we see India as representative for Southern 
civil society. We approach India as one Southern context that can offer insights into the ways in which 
contextual understandings of civil society can help develop perspectives on civil society’s roles, and the 
role that donors, Northern CSOs, and other Southern CSOs can potentially contribute to that role. India 
has a very rich and diverse civil society. Relations between Indian civil society organizations, state and 
society are complex, shaped by the diversity of Indian society, as well as the relations, dependencies and 
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inequalities in Indian society, and the conditions the state sets. These conditions imply that CSOs’ 
representative roles may or may not contribute to inclusive and sustainable development, and may also 
reinforce inequalities.  
 
Three themes 
 
From these starting points, we identify three key themes that require attention for coming to a policy 
that puts Southern CSOs more in the lead. While the themes were identified and will be discussed below 
with the Indian context of our case in mind, these themes will be relevant in other contexts as well.  
 
Engagement with contextually relevant civil society diversities 
First, at the most general level, we believe that a move to put Southern CSOs more in the lead would 
mean that collaboration between Northern CSOs and donors and CSOs in the Global South cannot start 
out from conceptualizations, programmes and partnerships that donors or Northern CSO already have in 
place. Collaboration requires giving more space to Southern CSOs’ ideas and approaches as starting 
points. While finding alignment will continue to be important, search for alignment will have to be more 
responsive to Southern CSOs’ understandings and agendas, in order not to dominate and overrule these, 
as may happen when established donor and Northern CSO agendas dominate collaboration (see e.g. 
Bownas, 2017).  
This also means that new questions may emerge for selection of CSOs to support. With many present 
forms of collaboration, alignment with donor and Northern CSO agendas forms a basic starting point for 
collaboration. More openness to Southern agendas would mean that new criteria for partner selection 
may need to be taken as starting point, looking more to the ways in which CSOs, in their contexts, from 
their own understandings and priorities, make relevant contributions to inclusive and sustainable 
development, and how agendas and understandings may complement each other. This implies that 
donors and Northern CSOs seek to support and collaborate from an awareness of the nature and 
composition of civil society in a setting (like a country). We also consider here the thought expressed in 
the Dialogue and Dissent Theory of Change that it is important to open up to the diversity of CSOs active 
in certain contexts.  
As the Dialogue and Dissent theory of Change rightly asserts, civil society is more than formally 
organized and independent CSOs that self-evidently contribute to inclusiveness. There are many types of 
groupings, formal and informal, embedded in local societies in many ways, with diverging implications 
for inclusiveness. Whom to support, and how that may contribute to inclusiveness, is not self-evident.  
In particular, unpacking the way in which different types of CSO conceive of, and shape, representation 
is crucial. Many CSOs in the global South as much as the North, take it upon themselves to represent 
others, speaking on behalf of, or for, societal groupings, perspectives and causes. In many cases, groups 
do not directly represent themselves, and that is also, or particularly, the case in highly unequal contexts 
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like India. Representation takes shape in many different ways, with highly diverging linkages with the 
represented sections of society, and from highly diverging organisational and ideological backgrounds. 
We expect that this has implications for who gets to be represented, in what form, with again highly 
diverging implications for inclusive development (Lama-Rewal, 2016). Seeking out collaborations with 
Southern CSOs, donors and Northern CSOs would therefore need to look closely into the way 
organizations construct representation, from what basis, and how this may or may not contribute to 
inclusive and sustainable development. In particular, achieving more understanding of representation of 
‘marginal’ and ‘vulnerable’ sections of society, central to many CSOs’ constructions of their 
representative role, is pertinent.  
Complementary roles in collaboration 
Secondly, the Dialogue and Dissent Theory of Change takes the starting point that different types of 
CSOs can have complementary roles. This starting point is important when it comes to the shaping of 
collaborations in Dialogue and Dissent programmes. We commonly find constellations of grassroots, 
domestic and international CSOs brought together in the understanding that each form has its own role 
to play in a particular programme. We also commonly find organizations with different types of 
capacities, knowledges and identities coming together (e.g. humanitarian, knowledge-based, faith-
based, environmental etc.). Such collaborations may make sense, as different CSOs can bring different 
voices, knowledges and capacities to the table, and connections between organisations at different 
levels make exchange and usage of different forms of information and influencing at different levels 
possible. However, so far we hardly see complementarity in collaborations studied from perspectives of 
Southern CSOs. If we take the starting point that Southern CSOs should be in the lead when it comes to 
shaping their representative roles, we need to learn more about how they see complementarities 
between their organisation and others, in their domestic contexts and beyond – from their 
understandings of their role and their agendas. Here we take the starting point that it is important to 
establish the nature and role of relevant diversities as they emerge for CSOs in their particular context. 
We do this from the understanding that in many contexts, there is a wide array of CSOs present, diverse 
in locally relevant ways. In many situations, a collaboration like Dialogue and Dissent will be one of many 
real or possible collaborations for CSOs, in a context where often multiple CSOs initiatives are also 
present, as (potential) allies, partners, competitors or opponent. To put it simply: apart from a 
programme like Dialogue and Dissent, a lot else will also be going on that will shape the relative 
contribution of individual initiatives; something hardly addressed in Dialogue and Dissent so far. CSOs 
will be navigating the possibilities of collaborations from their interpretations of the diversity of their 
CSO context. We want to learn: what different types of CSOs matter in what way, for CSOs faced with 
choices and dilemmas regarding collaboration? What are relevant distinctions that CSOs make when it 
comes to complementarity between CSOs? How can collaborations with different types of CSOs enable 
CSOs to do, be, and achieve things, from their perspective? In other words: who matters, for what? 
What is the relative role of South-South and international collaborations?                                                  
Taking the perspectives of Southern CSOs as a starting point may well put the roles of different types of 
domestic (Southern) and Northern CSOs in a new light. This may help redevelop these roles as 
contributing to advancing Southern CSOs’ agendas in complementary roles. It may also help reshape the 
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process of developing shared agendas (as Northern CSOs can less easily take the relevance of 
international dimensions and institutions as self-evident starting points in the development of 
programmes.  
This takes into consideration that it is well possible that complementarity as Southern CSOs conceive of 
it may look very different from the way programmes conceived by Northern donors or CSOs conceive of 
it. For example, Southern CSOs’ perspectives on relevant diversities in the composition of civil society 
(domestically and internationally), will shape their understandings of the ways collaboration with 
different CSOs in that wider environment enables them. Our research of CSOs’ locally shaped 
understandings of what is possible or desirable as advocacy goals, domestically and internationally, and 
their manoeuvring of their possibilities of collaboration within their wider CSO context, may lead to new 
insights on how to conceptualize collaboration and the relative role of different forms of CSOs, including 
Northern CSOs.  
Embedding in relations and context 
Collaborations themselves partly structure the representative role of CSOs, embedding them in 
programmes and the language, objectives and agendas that then are to be engaged with in some form. 
Importantly, questions of autonomy and ownership may emerge that further shape and constrict 
possibilities for representative roles. In addition, CSOs are often linked up with many other organizations 
and institutions in a society, including, religious and political organizations, as well as various state 
actors, which also provides the context for operating. Simple and straightforward assumptions of 
autonomy and ownership do not hold in such realities. Implications of this are important for 
understanding in what way and to what extent CSOs’ representative roles may or may not contribute to 
inclusive and sustainable development.  
  
Representation of ‘vulnerable’ and ‘marginal’ sections of Indian society 
 
The three themes discussed above provide elements for our framework for analyzing the representative 
role of CSOs in India. Importantly, we will do so from an interpretive perspective. For us, ‘Starting from 
the South’ means taking the perspectives, practices and contexts of Southern CSOs as starting points for 
understanding their representative roles. We will study how Indian CSOs shape their representative role 
navigating the possibilities (opportunities and constraints) they see and engage with, zooming in on the 
above three themes, which we see as interrelating. In this, we focus on a key dimension of CSOs’ 
representative role in the context of development: the representation of the so-called ‘marginal’ and 
‘vulnerable’, as key categories employed by CSOs in international development . This representation is 
done by highly diverse organisations, often rooted in highly different realities from those of the 
‘marginal’ and ‘vulnerable’, so designated. We will do so through two complementary case studies. One, 
on disaster risk reduction, studies representation of ‘vulnerable’ communities, an important ambition of 
Dialogue and Dissent partner Partners for Resilience and numerous other CSOs working on disaster risk 
reduction in India. The second case study focuses on representation of ‘marginalized’ women, an 
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important ambition of CountMeIn! (in particular CountMeIn! partner CREA, responsible for the alliance’s 
work in India) and numerous other CSOs working on women’s rights in India.  
In short, we will analyze the way representation of vulnerable and marginal sections of society by Indian 
CSOs takes shape, as they navigate their possibilities as they see them and are offered to them, 
embedded as they are in collaborations, relations and the state context in which they operate. Hereby, 
taking the three themes discussed above, we seek to identify:  
1. The relevant diversities of Indian civil society and how these differentiate Indian CSOs’ 
representation of ‘marginal’ and ‘vulnerable’ sections of Indian society, and their 
implications for inclusiveness.  
2. The relevant complementarities between CSOs as they are envisaged, and become 
apparent, in the collaborations they engage in shaping representation of ‘marginal’ and 
‘vulnerable’ sections of Indian society to contribute to inclusive and sustainable 
development.  
3. The ways in which relations and context implicate roles for Indian CSOs, with what 
implications for representation of ‘marginal’ and ‘vulnerable’ sections of Indian society.  
 
What can we be, with whom, here?  
 
While this may seem ambitious because of the apparent broadness of the issues we cover, the logic is 
simple. We seek to learn how different types of Indian CSOs answer two questions, in their 
understandings and practices: what can we be, with whom, here? From what understandings of the 
reality in which we find ourselves? This will make it possible to articulate and understand the 
possibilities and constraints that these realities and navigations imply for CSOs’ roles and their 
contributions to inclusive and sustainable development. To do this, we pull together three literatures: 
on collaboration, autonomy and ownership, and representation. In doing this, we are innovative: while 
we draw on important literatures on collaboration, autonomy and ownership, and representation, we 
are the first to study how CSO representation takes its shape embedded in the relations and 
collaborations we see so often addressed in existing literatures. The organizational perspective, 
analyzing how CSOs navigate the possibilities of shaping their representative role while embedded in 
collaborations and relations, will keep us focused while doing justice to complexities.  
For the largest part, the research focuses on Indian CSOs. For another part, we study state 
interpretations and engagements with CSOs, to understand how relevant diversities, complementarities 
and relations shape state engagements with CSOs. We will do this, to see how and to what extent CSOs’ 
roles as they seek to shape them are reflected, or not, in state interpretations and engagements with 
CSOs – and what this implies for the capacity of Indian CSOs to contribute to inclusive and sustainable 
development via their efforts to represent vulnerable and marginal sections of Indian society. This is 
from our conviction that the representative role of CSOs cannot be understood without extensive 
engagement with the context and actors they seek to influence.  
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Research questions 
 
Our overarching research question is: 
How does representation of ‘marginal’ and ‘vulnerable’ people by diverse CSOs take shape through 
collaborations in the Indian context? What are implications for CSOs’ contributions to inclusive and 
sustainable development?  
Subquestions all go into specific dimensions coming in with the shaping of representation discussed 
above: 
1. How is representation of ‘marginal’ and ‘vulnerable’ sections of society conceived and 
operationalized by diverse CSOs in the Indian context? What are the relevant diversities in 
this? With what implications for inclusiveness?  
2. How do Indian CSOs navigate the possibilities of collaboration with other CSOs in their 
representation of ‘marginal’ and ‘vulnerable’ sections of society? With what implications for 
complementarity between CSOs (domestically and internationally)?  
3. How do questions around ownership and autonomy emerge for diverse CSOs involved in 
collaboration with other CSOs, and how do dynamics around these shape their 
representation of ‘marginal’ and ‘vulnerable’ sections of society? 
4. How do the ways CSOs navigate their relations with the state and constituencies shape their 
representation of ‘marginal’ and ‘vulnerable’ sections of Indian society?  
5. How do CSOs’ diversities, complementarities and collaborations contribute to the extent 
and ways in which state actors in India engage with civil society?  
 
Structure of this literature review 
 
In chapter 2, 3 and 4 we offer the theoretical foundations of our project. In chapter 2, we review the 
existing research on CSO collaboration, showing current knowledge on how collaboration enables and 
constrains CSOs, while pointing out important knowledge gaps concerning the way CSOs in the Global 
South interpret and navigate the possibilities of collaboration. In chapter 3, we review literature on 
autonomy and ownership, considering the relative nature of autonomy and ownership in CSO 
representation since we find that CSOs operate embedded in different types of relations rather than 
individually. We also show how this raises important questions regarding autonomy and ownership in 
collaboration, moving beyond existing research on collaboration that emphasizes mainly how donor 
relations constrain autonomy and ownership. Chapter 4 zooms in on representation by CSOs, offering 
the conceptual and theoretical framework for our study of representation as plural, constructed, and to 
be understood contextually. This chapter therefore of necessity situates our study of representation in 
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the Indian context and zooms in on the constructs of marginality and vulnerability that are central to our 
study of representation in this project. It also identifies an knowledge gap important to our project: 
existing literature on representation by CSOs does not acknowledge that CSOs’ representative roles take 
their shape within the collaborative structures and relations in which they are embedded, and identifies 
key questions to raise on that.  
Chapters 5 and 6 directly focuses on the context in which our study is situated, making clear how our 
study of CSOs’ representative roles needs to be taken up considering this context. Chapter 5 offers an 
overview of historical development of the role of civil society in India, contemporary conditions shaping 
the role of civil society, and concrete engagements between CSOs and the Indian state. Chapter 6 
further deepens insight into the role of civil society in India charting the diversity of civil society 
manifestations in India.  
All chapters 2-6 conclude with a reflection on how insights drawn from them will inform our research.  
Chapter 7 integrates insights and perspectives we developed through the literature review, and 
discusses the innovativeness and policy relevance of the research.  
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Part 1 
Theoretical foundations  
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Chapter 2. Civil society collaborations  
 
 
Introduction 
 
The Dialogue and Dissent Theory of Change takes the starting point that CSOs, performing representative 
roles, can contribute to inclusive and sustainable development in the global South. It states that through 
articulating and communicating the voice of the people, inequalities in the societies can be addressed. 
The Dialogue and Dissent Theory of Change and many CSOs also emphasize the relevance of collaboration 
between grassroots, national and international-level CSOs, connecting agendas, voices and capacities, and 
building complementary capacities and synergies that can make change happen (Kamstra, 2017; Van 
Wessel et al. 2017).  
Collaboration between CSOs in the context of advocacy, as we understand it here, can be of a wide variety, 
including formal and informal arrangements as well as long-standing and more fluid and temporary 
engagements. Collaboration can take place at different levels, ranging from occasional information 
exchange and regular coordinated strategizing to long-term joint programming. Collaboration can be 
engaged in to advance the goals of individual organisations as well as shared goals. Such goals can be set 
out in advance or develop over the course of collaboration, as relations develop and opportunities are 
developed or encountered.  
Collaboration between CSOs has been a widely studied phenomenon, zooming in on the nature and 
operations of networks, partnerships, aid chains and alliances. Of particular interest for us is identifying 
different meanings that CSOs may attach to these varied forms of collaboration for CSOs, considering our 
interest in the way Southern CSOs navigate the possibilities of collaboration in shaping their 
representative roles. In this chapter, we survey the existing literature on CSO collaboration to make an 
inventory of the different considerations that might come in for CSOs considering engaging in 
collaboration with other CSOs. This existing research can be fruitfully structured along two dimensions: 
the way collaboration constrains and enables the advocacy role of Southern CSOs. Notably, while CSOs’ 
advocacy roles are, representative in nature, representation is not explicitly conceptualized in most of this 
literature. Development studies and political science appear to be disconnected. In our research, a main 
ambition will be to connect these fruitfully. However, because the literature reviewed in this chapter 
keeps representation implicit, we will employ the broad term of ‘advocacy’ to discuss the enabling and 
constraining factors we identified. For our approach to representation, we refer to chapter 4.  
 
How collaboration constrains Southern CSOs’ advocacy roles 
 
Many studies have shown that relations between donor agencies and Southern NGOs tend to be 
characterized by resource dependence, weak partnerships and the tendency of state machinery to turn 
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against CSOs that seek collaboration in any form from the international agencies. Many of these aspects 
are intertwined and overlapping in nature, having constraining effects on CSOs.  
Resource Dependence 
One of the major constraints that CSOs face is in securing continuous flow of funds from the international 
donor agencies with which they collaborate. While international collaboration does indeed bring about 
funding to many Southern CSOs, these CSOs experience fluctuations in funding due to the shifting 
priorities of their Northern international donors (Parks, 2008). Political, strategic and economic factors 
often influence the funding decisions of the bilateral donors, which in turn leads to instability in funding 
levels for countries, program areas and beneficiary organizations (Elbers and Arts, 2011; Park, 2008). It 
has been demonstrated that while foreign-funded financial-assistance has transformed developing 
countries it has also been demonstrated that this development comes at a cost. For example, conflict 
movements are often shifted into consensus movements that follow an institutional, resource-
dependent, non-conflictual strategy with no deep roots in the community. Donor agencies impose funding 
conditions on Southern CSOs that leads many CSOs to bureaucratise. This has been referred as NGOisation 
or institutional mono-cropping (Alvarez, 1999; Evans, 2004). Additionally, annulment of participatory 
approaches, reduced cultural sensitivity, weakened ties with the grassroots level and an enfeeblement of 
core value all also seem to be costs associated with this development (Hailey, 2000; Jalali, 2013; Wallace 
et al., 2006). In many transnational advocacy networks, CSOs and professional advocacy-brokers also act 
as intermediaries in these networks with organizational interests of their own (Heins, 2008). The inflow 
of donor-funded organizations, staffed by professionals, can lead to the prioritization of the donor’s 
subject matter interests. This often results in providing legitimacy to those professional organizations that 
are able ‘speak the same language’ of the donor agencies and are consequently unable to engage in a 
dialogical interaction that would characterize a true grass root social movement (Bownas, 2017). 
It is no surprise then that INGOs’ level of confrontation or conciliation in their advocacy work largely 
depends on the organization’s national origin (Stroup and Murdie, 2012) which might tend to influence 
the advocacy practices of the Southern partnering CSOs which are further dependent on them for 
resources and funds. CSOs have been ‘caught up in relations with funding sources, governments, and 
neoliberal processes that create a double-bind for CSOs, situated between the powerful forces dominating 
them and the disenfranchised communities they intend to serve’ (Bernal and Grewal, 2014, p. 4). In 
international collaborations, where the main donor agency is from the Northern hemisphere, there is also 
sizeable control and influence over the Southern CSOs on their project design, implementation, 
monitoring, reporting and evaluation too (see Ashman, 2001; Bornstein, 2003; Ebrahim, 2003; Elbers and 
Arts, 2011; Elbers and Schulpen, 2011; Lister, 2000; Michael, 2004). At times, in the name of capacity 
development for the Southern CSOs, the energy is concentrated upon improving the competences related 
to conforming to donors’ requirement rather than capabilities enhancing performance (Wetterberg et al., 
2015). There has been a debate regarding the effectiveness of capacity development interventions and 
the underlying complexities and the lack of agreement on the approaches to building capacity (Ibid; 
Brinkerhoff and Morgan, 2010). 
Furthermore, in CSOs-funder relations of Southern CSO with Northern INGOs, it is also seen that in some 
cases domestic CSOs divert from their actual official mission, organizational structure and processes due 
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to excessive conditionalities and onerous reporting requirements expected from them (see AbouAssi, 
2013; Ebrahim, 2003; Edwards and Hulme, 1996; Guo and Acar, 2005; Khieng and Dahles, 2015; O’Brien 
and Evans, 2016; Parks, 2008). Therefore, in order to secure and maintain continuous flow of funding, 
many domestic CSOs adopt strategies that would serve the interest of those who control those resources, 
such as changing the agenda of their advocacy. As a consequence of being in a resource-dependent 
relationship, Southern CSOs often lose autonomy and legitimacy and find themselves in asymmetrical 
power relationships (Elbers and Arts, 2011; den Hond et al., 2015; Jalali, 2013; Johnson and Prakash, 
2007).  
Weak partnerships 
The concept of partnership is often used to describe all forms of collaborative arrangement in which actors 
from two or more spheres of society (state, market and/or civil society) are involved in a non-hierarchical 
process and aim at promoting sustainable development (Van Huijstee et al. 2007; Glasbergen, 2007). 
Partnership is a broad collaboration category that includes cooperation between Northern and Southern 
CSOs, alliance between individual companies and CSOs, and rapport between donor and recipient 
governments and tri-sector initiatives combining the business and civil society sector with the government 
(Bäckstrand, 2006; Brinkerhoff, 2002; Fowler, 1998; Glasbergen, 2007; Glasbergen and Miranda, 2003). 
Furthermore, partnerships are championed for being associated with shared goals, responsibilities and 
governance. They often are characterized by long-term commitments for working together, open 
dialogue, mutual accountability and respect, trust, balance of power, and reflecting the idea of a mutually 
dependent relationship based on equality (Abrahamsen, 2004; Fowler, 2000; Glasbergen, 2007; Johnson 
and Wilson, 2006; Lister, 2000; Unwin, 2005). Therefore, partnerships between various CSOs have been 
hailed as success. 
However, partnerships also have a flip side to them as well. In many cases, it has been noted that Northern 
agencies solely set the rules that govern partnerships, based on their own norms, values and beliefs 
(Elbers and Schulpen, 2011), as they often control resources, leading to power imbalances (Gulati and 
Sytch, 2007; O’Brien and Evans, 2016; Ulrich and Barney, 1984). Thus, partnerships are not always on an 
equal platform, as inequalities often exist between the identities of partners within development projects, 
with the donor portrayed as superior, active and reliable, while the recipient ‘partner’ is portrayed as 
inferior, passive and unreliable (Baaz, 2005). The point to note here is that, ‘a partnership agreement will 
not automatically change the nature of relationships, therefore inequalities stemming from unequal 
power relations, multiple political and economic interests, or diverging norms and values continue to 
exist’ (Zingerli, 2010, p. 222). All this contributes to a weak partnership. 
When development organizations are responding to crises, it requires relevant parties to cooperate to 
achieve a successful partnership. Partnerships can become problematic because of large number and 
range of actors involved, who have substantial differences in their values, goals and activities (Schaaf, 
2015). The reasons for not cooperating in partnerships include vested interests in the outcomes, disputes 
about what works, and perceived weaknesses of multilateral agencies to effectively disburse and monitor 
aid (Wood, 2011). The majority of Indian CSOs rely on resources, which they do not control; hence survival 
and success are subject to their ability to engage in inter-organizational relationships, which allow 
acquiring those resources (Drees and Heugens, 2013; Ellstrand et al., 2002). CSOs working in the global 
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South are prone to the external control because of their resource reliance on Northern CSOs (Hudock, 
1995; Lister, 2000). 
In the transnational advocacy network, agendas, targets and strategies can vary in different political 
arenas, and the exchange of information or services may be dense and unbalanced in the NGO network. 
The quality of ties between different members of a network are hardly ever constant, and the rules in a 
campaign are far from common (Jordan and Van Tuijl, 2000: 2062). 
Thus the mismatch of power creates perceived or real imbalances. It leads to (perceived) domination by 
one of the partners, too much intrusion in partner’s affairs, micromanagement, ownership and exclusivity 
issues (Berger et al., 2004). Partnerships with traditional donors are hindered by historical inequalities in 
power, limiting opportunities for key partnership principles of respect, trust, reciprocity and mutual 
learning (Schaaf, 2015). 
Curbing of Civic Space  
Certain regimes, even in liberal democratic systems, may fear civil society as hostile to the power centre 
(Kumar, 2012; Sahoo, 2013). This is a cause of worry worldwide, and part of the trend of shrinking civic 
space (Kamstra 2017). At times, international collaborations can put a constraint on the domestic roles of 
the CSOs, when they collaborate or have partnerships with INGOs (Sahoo, 2017). Therefore, when 
domestic CSOs partner with transnational civil society alliances and end up questioning the policies of 
governments and inter-governmental organizations, this leads to friction in certain cases. States often 
respond by curbing the activities of the CSOs, for example by monitoring their work and putting a check 
on their funding from the international arena (Sahoo, 2017).  
For example, India is a case of a strong state that increasingly constrains civic space (Bornstein and 
Sharma, 2016), e.g. by powerful instruments like the Foreign Contributions Regulatory Act (FCRA) and the 
Income Tax Act and other such procedural instruments with which it controls the CSOs.  
Navigating constraints 
While constraints have been widely studied, less research focuses on the ways Southern CSOs might 
handle these. Some literature that focuses on the ways Southern CSOs engage with constraints imposed 
by the state or international donor partners does provide relevant insights. For example, due to the 
pressure from donors to become more professional and CSOs own coping survival strategy, CSOs may 
‘NGOise’ as a way to engage with constraints (Lang, 2012; Kamstra and Schulpen, 2015). Southern CSOs 
have also been described as employing a whole range of strategic responses by which they navigate 
donor conditions. Organizations may try to avoid interaction with stakeholders, preventing exposure of 
the organization to adverse institutional pressures; Organizations may try to influence the content of 
institutional pressures; organizations may try to buffer themselves against unavoidable institutional 
pressures, taking compensatory measures to minimize the negative effects of institutional pressures; 
Organizations may try to portray themselves in a positive light in front of stakeholders, manipulating the 
perceptions of their donors (Elbers and Arts, 2011). For Vietnam, Pallas and Nguyen (2018) show that 
the rules meant to put a check on the CSOs by the state, may increase local CSOs’ professionalism, 
credibility and financial independence, enhancing their ability to engage in advocacy and effectively 
influence international actors and donors (ibid). While literature on these forms of navigation appears 
limited in its scope, these research results do indicate that we should see CSOs as navigating the 
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possibilities of their representative roles as agents, from their own perspectives, strategies and choices 
in engaging with constraints.  
 
How collaboration enables Southern CSOs’ advocacy roles 
 
In order to achieve their goals, Southern CSOs have been quite active in forming/using alliances and 
partnerships (Austin, 2007). While funding has been widely noted as a key motivator for Southern CSOs 
to engage in collaborations with international NGOs, there are many other ways by which collaboration 
may help CSOs to perform their representative roles. A wide range of literature points to the enabling 
dimensions of CSO collaboration, be it that in many cases Southern perspectives are not particularly 
highlighted.  
Capacity Development 
The international development community has identified capacity development as important and many 
actors, including CSOs, have contributed to the capacity of Southern CSOs through interventions such as 
resource transfer, trainings and organizational strengthening (Wetterberg et al., 2015). Alliances have 
enabled easy exchange of information and further contributed to personal contacts among the key 
players/actors (Brown et al., 2000; Hall, 1992; Treakle, 1998). There has also been a growing recognition 
by the INGOs, multilateral institutions and donor states regarding the necessity of local and country 
ownership in sustainable development, where the focus of development has shifted to build capacity ‘on 
the ground’. 
Relatedly, many international CSOs have their origin in the global North and have branch organizations, 
local partners and alliances in the developing countries. In recent years, it is increasingly suggested that 
with the rise of civil society organizations in developing countries, and Northern CSOs’ rethinking of their 
roles, it is good to shift roles and operations and give a more leading role to Southern CSOs, making 
international collaborations more locally rooted and capacitating locally owned development (Banks et 
al., 2015; Forsch, 2018; Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2018).  
Thus, in many states, INGOs are presently seeking to build up the capacity of their Southern countries 
collaborating partners, by having a ‘country up’ focus on policy influencing (Goodman, 2016; Walker and 
Christie, 2015). According to Walker and Christie (2015), with the recent and current partial change in 
INGOs’ approach from ‘top down’ to ‘country up’, in collaborations with the Global South, the Southern 
CSO benefit when the INGOs have flexible frameworks that allow for greater in-country leadership. This 
further amplifies the role of influencing networks, where the aim is to empower local actors and help in 
building upon country-driven initiatives across themes with cross-country technical expertise through 
communication platforms, knowledge hubs etc. (Goodman, 2016). 
Exchange of information/knowledge  
Collaboration with INGOs enables producing, sharing and disseminating information. By collaboration, 
Southern CSOs have access to the data and information which allows diverse CSOs to work and speak as 
a collective voice (O’Brien and Evans, 2016). Furthermore, collaboration enables exchange of experiences, 
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best practices and transfer of knowledge of knowledge (Maurer et al. 2011; O’Brien and Evans, 2016). 
International collaborations help the domestic CSO in working together on the rise of problems which are 
international in nature but have impacts on the domestic front, such as the rise of transnational 
environmental problems like climate change (Young, 1997). Through globalization, international and 
collaborations of CSOs have emerged in response to problems such as delivering services and responding 
to disasters, analyzing and advocating policy alternatives, advocating policy changes, and with the 
increased flow of information have made collaboration a lot easier and effective (Boli and Thomas, 1999; 
Fox and Brown, 1998; Keck and Sikkink, 1998).  
Spreading values and norms 
Collaboration enables inter-organizational learning and problem solving. The exchange of information, 
engagements and capacity building enable civil society actors to identify the causes of problems, assess 
solutions, and implementation plans across geopolitical and cultural boundaries (Brown et al., 2000). 
International collaborations advance comprehending, expressing and integrating agendas on issues across 
value differences and help to mobilize publics on international problems (Boli and Thomas, 1999; Fox and 
Brown, 1998; Keck and Sikkink, 1998). Furthermore, global informational networks also help in identifying 
international problems, which otherwise would not be raised, due to lack of funds (Brown et al. 2000), 
and advance the development of shared values and norms. Shared international values and norms can 
help in articulating and interpreting new problems and in this, alliances between INGOs and Southern 
CSOs prove to be helpful in guiding future policies and practices at international and national levels (Boli 
and Thomas, 1999). 
Campaign Alliances 
International campaigns can have a far-reaching impact in that they can advance, communicate and help 
enforce global public policies to respond to problems that affect the Global South. Campaign alliances on 
one issue can become a medium for collaboration for future campaigns on other similar issues (Fox and 
Brown, 1998; Khagram, 2004). The collaborations also can reform agendas and operations of international 
institutions, creating and sharing social innovations across networks by highlighting agendas and the role 
of CSOs on international and national platforms, engaging in multi-level or parallel advocacy with the work 
at different levels feeding into each other. Thus alliances do have the power to influence many 
international and national negotiations and decisions in both the developed and developing world 
(Brinkerhoff, 1999; Gray, 1989; Susskind, 1999).  
 
Promoting transnational networks 
Transnational advocacy networks promote convergence of social and cultural norms, which support the 
processes of regional and international integration (Keck and Sikkink, 1998; 1999). In this way 
international collaboration facilitates the transnational advocacy network around global campaigns; 
which are often named after the dominant concern or after the targeted object (Jordan and Van Tuijl, 
2000; Keck and Sikkink, 1998). For example, the Land Mine Campaign is commonly understood to describe 
a global campaign against the use of land mines. Thus, increasing the role of non-state actors, and the role 
of internet and other forms of communication technologies which has changed the nature of mobilization; 
for example as seen especially after the advent of the Arab Spring in 2011 (Khondker, 2011). The actors 
 20 
 
that work in the transnational networks on a particular issue, share and are bound by a common 
discourse, exchange of information, services; and also the actors bring with them new sets of ideas, norms 
and discourses into the policy debates and serve as sources of information and testimony (Ibid). 
Transnational networks have promoted and encouraged, issue based campaigns; as networks breed, 
allowing networking becomes an inventory of action that is dispersed transnationally. Thus over time, in 
these issue areas, participation in transnational networks has become an essential component of the 
collective identities of the activists involved (Ibid: 93). 
Furthermore, through collaboration the CSOs also get help in building collective action and political 
participation, where the aim is to build citizen capacity building (Walker and Christie, 2015). In this 
process, transnational advocacy networks link activists in developed countries with others from less 
developed countries; and they can serve a extremely helpful role when the state disengages from 
domestic actors. Domestic CSOs may directly seek international allies to try to bring pressure on their 
states from outside, via the well-known ‘boomerang effect’  (Keck and Sikkink, 1998; 1999). 
Spreading democratic and egalitarian values 
The alliances of INGOs, networks, coalitions and social movement organizations, as vital political actors 
have been energized by the demand to create collective vibrant democratic ideals. The wave of 
democratic transitions in the late 1980s and early 1990s brought a surge in funding for democratisation 
and governance programmes of various CSOs. These included group that were established for all kinds of 
causes, including environmental conservation, rights of minorities and indigenous people, improving 
governance, anti-corruption, women’s empowerment, and micro-enterprise development etc. 
(Carothers, 2000; Parks, 2008). INGOs have played also an instrumental role in addressing conditions of 
inequality, lack of political participation and disempowerment in the Global South. In order to take this 
forward effectively, recently there has been an increasing emphasis on promoting advocacy at the local, 
national and transnational levels and making Southern CSOs leaders of their own development with the 
support from the INGOs (Foresti and Ludi, 2007; Goodman, 2016).  
Other enabling factors 
Beyond these prominently researched enabling factors, there are some indications that certain other 
enabling factors may also be relevant, such as the capacity of certain CSOs to confer legitimacy or 
credibility to their CSO partners , and the capacity of certain international CSOs to play a role in the 
protection of local activists, such as human rights defenders (Elbers et al., 2018; Nababan, 2008). 
However, theory evidence regarding these factors is much more limited than for the other factors.  
 
Implications for our research: navigating possibilities of collaboration 
 
As we see above, existing scholarship on advocacy collaboration among CSOs gives relatively much 
importance to high-profile transnational campaigns and emphasizes transnational dimensions of 
collaboration, with relatively high prominence to the INGOs that have often been in the lead in these 
collaborations. In this literature, a wide range of enabling and constraining factors is identified. While 
often taking roles of INGOs as central, existing literature also problematizes how the perspectives and 
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setting of the agendas for collaborations have often been found to be primarily shaped by Northern 
INGOs. To the extent there is attention for Southern perspectives, most of the research has focused on 
the ways in which the functioning of Southern CSOs is constrained and enabled when CSOs collaborate 
internationally and the consequences this has for the representative role of CSOs.  
However, little is known about the ways Southern CSOs see the nature and role of different forms of 
collaboration with different types of CSOs in their work. While research may shed light on different 
constraining and enabling factors, it hardly ever sheds light on the relative importance of certain factors 
for CSOs (but see O’Brien and Evans 2016 for an exception, pointing out the relative importance of funding 
and knowledge exchange in his selected case). We also do not learn to what extent and how different 
factors will in fact be acknowledged and engaged with by Southern CSOs, or how we should understand 
the engagement with different factors contextually. Finally, and relatedly, literature so far does not 
engage with the diversity of CSOs that NGOs typically are exposed to in their domestic environment as 
well as internationally, and how this diversity is engaged with. How different NGOs are perhaps to be seen 
as able to perform different and complementary roles, remains out of sight.  
Existing literature does suggest that Southern CSOs seek various resources and confront dependency with 
international partners. Financial dependency impacts the autonomy of Southern CSOs. But by having 
partnerships they do get access not only to financial resources, but also to less tangible resources like 
information, credibility, identity, access to political arenas and organizational legitimacy – while at least 
in some cases seeking to navigate imbalances, as the limited literature we have on this indicates. This 
suggests that Southern CSOs are neither snubbing power imbalances nor accepting them but are 
proactively engaging with imbalances shaping collective action (Carmin, 2003; Choi et al., 2005; Edwards 
and McCarthy, 2004; Lister, 2000; O’Brien and Evans, 2016). Some available literature shows these 
dynamics as intricate processes of relating and meaning-making, situated in organizational fields where 
CSOs participate and create interdependencies and roles (Antlöv et. Al, 2010; Bownas, 2017; Deo and 
McDuie, 2011; Sokphea, 2017). We wish to take this particular line of research further.  
To be able to understand the role of collaborations for Southern CSOs, we need to pay closer attention to 
the ways that the possibilities of collaboration shape domestic CSOs’ roles as they interact, exchange 
resources, and navigate opportunities, dependencies and constraints in their collaborations at 
international and domestic levels. In this project, we approach Southern CSOs as agents who engage in 
collaboration from their own perspectives, based on their understandings of their realities and the 
possibilities of that reality, devising strategy while engaging with both. It is important to realize here that 
CSOs commonly are exposed to a wide range of collaboration possibilities, with CSOs engaging in some 
opportunities, while foregoing others, with relative and different roles assigned to different 
collaborations. Importantly, collaboration often takes place at different levels, of which the international 
one may or may not be given the prime importance that we often find it accorded in the literature on CSO 
collaboration in the field of development studies. Furthermore, depending on context, domain and type 
of organization, different possibilities and constraints may emerge as relevant. For example, we may 
consider here the increasingly problematic status of some forms of international collaboration for CSOs 
in India and elsewhere, due to constricting civic space. Our research focuses on the way Southern CSOs 
consider, and make choices, with regard to collaboration, zooming in on their understandings of the 
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possibilities and constraints that they see in the wide range of collaborations possibilities in their context 
(at domestic and international levels), from their organizational perspective. We plan to draw on this 
chapter to help inform our research of: 
1. What constraining and enabling factors CSOs identify as important when it comes to collaboration with 
other CSOs.  
2. What relevant diversities among CSOs come in as relevant in considerations regarding collaboration. 
3. What relevant complementarities and relative roles do CSOs identify between CSOs, when it comes to 
collaboration. 
4. How perceived conditions of collaboration as perceived (under 1-3 above) figure in CSOs’ strategic 
decision making on collaboration, in light of their own identities, convictions, ways of working and 
objectives. 
5. Implications of the above for the involved CSOs’ representation of vulnerable groupings in the context 
of the policy influencing.  
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Chapter 3. Autonomy and ownership 
 
Introduction 
 
Autonomy and ownership are essential for civil society organizations’ (CSOs) functioning, as both are 
fundamental to what CSOs stand for - ‘articulating the needs, interests, rights and grievances of the 
people’ (Sangita, 2008: 3). In other words, autonomy and ownership of CSOs are central to their 
representative roles. Literature on CSOs indeed commonly defines the civil society space as 
‘autonomous or independent’ from the state and private sector, operating as a ‘third sector,’ and 
shaping ‘social capital’ (Brinkerhoff, 1999; Foley and Edwards, 1996; Putnam, 1995). However, some 
argue that this is an accurate assessment of CSOs ‘in theory, but in practice the boundaries between the 
three sectors—state, market and civil society—are blurred’ (Appe, 2013; Foley and Edwards, 1996; 
Putnam, 1995; Salamon, 1994). There are multiple levels and varied contexts of CSOs’ functioning, and 
their structures and patterns of operation have undergone substantial change.  
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CSOs now operate in a webbed environment with the emergence of transnational-, national-, local-, and 
grassroots-level advocacy and collaboration (Anheier and Themudo, 2002). Therefore, autonomy and 
ownership need to be addressed more deeply given the complex networks and new situations. Several 
types of questions and multiple challenges resurface regarding autonomy and ownership when financial, 
situational, and strategic collaborations/relationships are established. In this context, the central puzzle 
in this piece is: How do collaborations influence CSOs’ autonomy and ownership?  
This literature review aims to do the following: 1) explore the concepts of autonomy and ownership and 
relate them to CSOs and collaborations; 2) highlight the importance of autonomy and ownership for 
CSOs (in relation to both the state and the market); 3) present the discussions and debates on autonomy 
and ownership in CSOs in the context of India and examine their relation to similar debates at the global 
level; and 4) Brings out the ways in which the empirical research draws from this literature and the 
knowledge gaps that it aims to address within the existing literature. This review is structured in the 
following way: addressing autonomy, exploring its relevance for civil society collaborations, the state, 
and the market. This section moves back and forth between international discourse and the Indian 
context. The second part deals with ownership, defining the concept and establishing its relevance for 
civil society and its implications for CSO collaborations. The third part relates the first two to discussions 
about inclusive development and the role of CSOs. This chapter concludes by identifying the implications 
of this chapter for our research.  
All of the above aims of the literature review become relevant from the standpoint of this project. 1) In 
raising relevant questions on autonomy and ownership this review relates to the representative roles of 
CSOs. 2) The review situates these issues from the perspective of South by bringing in the context of 
India. 3) It tries to advance the concerns raised on the two concepts in the Dialogue and Dissent 
document. The Dialogue and Dissent Theory of Change situates autonomy and ownership of CSOs as 
primary goals within the development narrative (Kamstra, 2017). However, in the Theory of Change 
these concepts do not get unpacked and problematized, or the complexities linked to them identified. 
The review brings forward the debates on autonomy and ownership within civil society collaborations to 
take stock of current knowledge that can guide our research on ownership and autonomy to advance 
engagements with these concepts in ways that does justice to the complexities involved.  
 
Autonomy 
 
Autonomy can be defined both as an attribute of the individual or a collective. In the case of CSOs, 
unless the focus is on the autonomy of individuals working there, in most instances, it is contextualized 
as an attribute of a collective. Whether that collective concerns social movements, voluntary groups, 
non-governmental organizations (NGO), or various other entities occupying the civil society space. For 
instance, in the context of social movements, autonomy is talked about as the ‘collective autonomy’ of 
the movement, not the autonomy of individual participants in the movement (Katsiaficas, 2006). This 
definition of autonomy as ‘collective’ refers to autonomy as ‘self-legislation or creating a group’s own 
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custom and law’ (Chatterton, 2005: 546). Autonomy also entails ‘mutual aid’ and ‘a demand to be heard 
and recognized’ (Foran 2003, cited in Chatterton, 2005: 545). Beyond this, the concept generates 
intense debate not only about whose autonomy is being considered but also from whom it is being 
sought. The literature seems to be primarily divided into concerns with autonomy from the state, from 
capital (the market), and from hegemonic relations that result in ‘colonial domination and development 
dependency’ (Bohm and Spicer, 2010: 8). In an attempt to address the question of autonomy from 
whom or from what, the next sections bring into focus some of the arguments and discussions on 
autonomy of civil society vis-à-vis the state, the market, and other civil society entities. 
How autonomy is viewed is also dependent on the relation to what it is being defined. For instance, 
Saeki (2011: 385) problematized the autonomy of CSOs in relation to political organizations, stating that 
the ‘boundaries between civil and political organizations remain fluid, permeable and contentious.’ 
Saeki (2011) also points out that, in democracies, individuals join both political parties and CSOs—It is 
not one or the other; on many occasions, it is both. Under such circumstances, individuals with 
ideological affiliations mold civil society to fit a restrictive space and problematize autonomy, even 
without external interference (from, e.g., the state or the market). 
It is important to situate CSO autonomy not only in relation to the state and to political affiliations, but 
also as embedded within numerous collaborations. There are issues of boundaries not only between 
civil and political organizations, but also, for example, among CSOs, between NGOs and social 
movements, and between self-help groups and NGOs. Autonomy becomes complex when we situate it 
within CSOs—a hybrid and diverse set of organizations functioning as ‘private, not for profit, both formal 
and even informal organizations’ (Brandsen, Trommel and Verschuere, 2017). For example, many 
service delivery organizations in health care and education have moved in the direction of state. Given 
that the boundaries between CSOs are blurred, it is pertinent to examine how autonomy is construed in 
collaborations. 
CSOs’ autonomy is affected when they collaborate and act as, for example, intermediaries, allies, 
receivers or donors. in defining and realizing these concepts. CSOs collaborate for specific goals, 
expectations and strategic reasons. Autonomy thus needs to be defined through an analysis of these 
reasons. For example, whether an organization is able to make choices in ‘allocating internal resources’ 
and has the ‘freedom to invest its resources in activities that are unrelated to satisfying the obligations 
or expectations of an organization with which it develops a relation’ (Oliver, 1991: 945). 
Oliver (1991: 945) defined ‘organizational autonomy’ as ‘an organization’s freedom to make its own 
decisions about the use and allocation of its internal resources without reference or regard to the 
demands of the linkage partners.’ Others have focused on ‘operational autonomy,’ which refers to ‘an 
organization’s freedom to formulate and pursue a self-determined agenda without undue external 
pressures’ (Wang, 2006: 4). Organizations, in general, ‘avoid being controlled’ and decide on 
collaborations based on the level of autonomy they can exercise (Oliver, 1991). Autonomy becomes a 
significant question in collaborations because it influences internal decision making related to the 
‘commitment of time, personal, capital or other types of resources’ (Oliver, 1991: 94). Whether 
autonomy becomes compromised is dependent on the types of relationships on which collaborations 
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are based—a written agreement, a commitment to some amount of resource sharing, a verbal 
agreement, or an exchange of ideas. All of these ideas can be situated rationally within the dominant 
understandings in the literature on CSO autonomy and collaborations. 
 
CSOs, collaborations, and autonomy 
Earlier contributions to the literature dealing with CSOs suggested that the non-profit sector relied on 
‘charitable contributions’ in a substantial manner and they often compromised on their autonomy in 
exchange for resources (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). However, recent literature departs from this 
analysis in two ways. First, CSOs are now viewed beyond the non-profit sector, with varied organizations 
involved and with far more complex relationships among them (Deo, 2011; Sahoo, 2013). Second, there 
is increasing recognition that CSOs are subject to complex power dynamics and challenges (Evans and 
O’Brien, 2016; Gray and Wood, 1991). 
However, most of the existing literature primarily analyzes the NGO sector, narrowly defining both civil 
society and NGOs as contributors to the development agenda within civil society (Banks et al., 2015; 
Sahoo, 2013). Recent literature on civil society collaborations questions the limited understanding of 
CSOs as secular organizations promoting democratic goals (Banks et al. 2015; Deo, 2016; Sahoo, 2013). 
There are groups and associations within the civil society space organized around caste, class, religion, 
gender, and several other identities. These pose different challenges to the autonomy of CSOs while 
they collaborate.  
 
Civil society’s autonomy from the state  
Most of the dominant literature on CSOs and autonomy has analyzed the concept in relation to the state 
or to market/foreign aid politics.1 However, CSOs at different stages and levels communicate, interact, 
and build networks with the state and its agencies. Any discussion of civil society’s autonomy therefore 
needs to be analyzed in view of the state. The definition of civil society as a space of ‘voluntary 
association and activity that exists in relative separation from the state and the market’ needs further 
investigation through a review of the literature on this theme (Smith, in Edwards, 2011). 
Two key categories of relationships have been a constant source of investigation in existing research on 
civil society. The first of these is the relationship between CSOs (primarily civil society movements and 
non-voluntary organizations) and market forces. The literature on this relationship primarily deals with 
civil society shaping market forces and vice-versa and explores how autonomy emerged as a vantage 
point for understanding these processes (Edwards, 2010; Gray, 2000; Sen, 2000; Zadek, 2011). The 
                                                 
1 See, for instance, Fowler (2011) who brings out in detail the entire politics around the developmental NGOs from the 1970s to 
the 2000s, the North–South gap within the aid channel, and the issues related to autonomy that emerge from market-driven 
foreign aid. 
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second relationship concerns the autonomy of civil society in relation to the state and its apparatus.2 
Analyzing this relationship is significant in terms of 1) understanding how can autonomy be defined in 
the context of civil society; 2) determining autonomy from whom and from what; and 3) relating to key 
elements of the autonomy of civil society and moving the research towards issues relevant in 
contemporary analysis. 
The autonomy of civil society checks the functioning of the state, makes it more accountable and 
responsive to the needs of a pluralistic society, works against the concentration of economic and social 
power, and provides space for popular resistance (James and Caliguire, 1996). Citizens as members of 
civil society groups and associations have the opportunity to associate themselves with activities outside 
the realm of the state. This helps them to build a life of voluntarism and hold their own ground away 
from government scrutiny and interference (Rosenblum and Lesch in Edwards, 2011). It is through the 
role of civil society groups in empowering the powerless that autonomy becomes a vital force. This role 
the civil society performs by operating within a political space rather than a non-political one 
(Bayat,1997; Kaldor, 2003). Associations provide a space for political participation and vociferously 
engage in political advocacy (Rosenblum and Lesch, in Edwards, 2011). Though operating in a political 
space, civil society associations, groups, and organizations desire to be autonomous of the state, as sites 
of advocacy, participation, resistance, and spaces for the personal development of individuals and 
groups. They are expected to be autonomous to enable them to demand more transparency and 
accountability from institutions of the state. Over the years, these organizations have acted as pressure 
groups to make the state become aware of, acknowledge, and act on the demands of the people. 
Although the above discussion does reflect the desire for more civil society autonomy from the state, 
yet, it seemingly becomes impossible because the legal framework within which civil society operates is 
governed by the state. A powerful collaboration is initiated between the state and civil society within 
the legal framework, and is extended when the ‘government becomes a material patron, purchaser, 
funder and partner’ of the several activities initiated by civil society (Rosenblum and Lesch in Edwards, 
2011: 291). An emergent question therefore is how far civil society, in its several forms (e.g. voluntary 
groups, associations, and advocacy organizations), can seek to be autonomous when it clearly has a 
relationship with the state, from which it cannot disentangle itself. In the Indian context, as Chandhoke 
(2012: 40) points out, it is virtually impossible to ‘conceptualize the civil society in abstraction from the 
state as it is the state that determined the boundaries of civil society activism.’ Thus, the literature 
would suggest that autonomy from the state cannot be a given for civil society. Several questions are 
asked in determining civil society’s degree of autonomy from the state: How far the autonomy of civil 
society is diminished when it comes in contact with the state? Does this impact the plural democratic 
character of CSOs? Are there implications for CSOs’ everyday functioning, capacity to deliver, and 
decision-making? 
The answers to these questions have largely been context specific. Every region and country is unique 
when it comes to the evolution of the civil society space, with different states and forms of government. 
                                                 
2 A large number of studies in Latin American countries have dealt with the relationship between the civil society networks and 
the state in these countries. Also in the context of China, the relationship of civil society with the state has been closely 
investigated. See Howell (2011) and Dagnino (2011).  
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Although it is appealing to believe that democratic systems mean more autonomy for civil society, 
compared to authoritarian systems, this is not necessarily the case. There are multiple, context-specific 
layers to the relationships involved. In many countries, including India, some CSOs are linked with the 
state through political parties or funding relations, complicating any notion of civil society’s autonomy. 
The state enters into a partnership with CSOs with the intention and desire for its citizens to ‘participate 
and self-organize,’ but, in reality, there is a threat that the state will ‘take over such initiatives, leading to 
a manufactured civil society that has little to do with spontaneous citizen initiatives’ (Brandsen, 
Trommel and Verschuere, 2017: 676). Another complication is that authoritarian systems have 
witnessed a more complex web of civil society–state relationships than might be assumed. For instance, 
China’s example suggests that, despite having a communist government with strict state control, non-
profit boards have held their ground at the network level, if not so much at the individual level 
(Heemskerk and Takes, 2016; Ma and DeDeo, 2017). There is also evidence of flourishing civil society 
initiatives in multiple cities in China. Analysts view this development as the Chinese NGO sector reaching 
a stage where the ‘state management of Chinese NGOs through various regulations may actually 
provide an opportunity for NGOs to be part of the policy making process’ (Hsu and Hasmath, 2017: 23). 
In line with the above observations, we see it as essential to bring forward the complexities involved in 
civil society–state relationships in our research project. However, it is necessary to relate to the 
widespread challenge to civil society space from the state seen worldwide. In numerous countries, there 
are instances where the government has practically stifled certain civil society movements or 
organizations that raise uncomfortable questions or go against government policies. More generally, in 
many countries, we witness a trend of CSOs functioning within a restricted space, irrespective of the 
type of government. From 2004 to 2010, ‘more than fifty countries considered or enacted measures 
restricting civil society and several with authoritarian tendencies worked on notions of ‘managed civil 
society’’ (Rutzen, 2015: 30). These measures have been taken by individual countries for various reasons 
– 1) responding to a growing need for strong ‘national security’ measures, 2) protecting sovereignty in 
the wake of large amounts of incoming foreign funding for CSOs, 3) promoting a culture of transparency 
and accountability in the civil society sector, and 4) enhancing aid effectiveness and coordination 
(Rutzen, 2015). Such restrictions have raised questions regarding CSOs’ autonomous character and their 
ability to emerge as agents of positive transformative change in society. Increasingly, democratic 
regimes around the world have ‘resorted to practices that hinder the work of CSOs and networks, 
particularly those promoting democracy, human rights, transparency and civic participation’ (Report to 
the Working Group on Enabling and Protecting Civil Society, 2017: 11). In light of these observations, an 
important question to be asked is to what extent and in what ways the autonomy of CSOs is 
compromised through the links and under the restrictions discussed above. 
 
Civil society and the state in India 
At this point, it is useful to explore the emerging relationship between CSOs and the state in India and its 
implications for CSOs’ autonomy. The following set of arguments emerge from the available literature 
on civil society–state relationships in India: 
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1) Civil society is a vibrant and plural space in India, with a range of institutions, organizations, and 
associations falling under it (Chandhoke, 2011: 180). The plural character of civil society in India is 
suggestive of the positive nature of the relationship between civil society and the state. 
2) Within this plural and vibrant space are restrictions in relation to NGOs and social movements (Kilby, 
2011: 18). There is an existing discourse that suggests that the state keeps a tight grip on CSOs and 
prefers them to be at a distance from politics, regulating international funding to NGOs and bringing in 
new laws to monitor their functioning. Over the years, successive governments in India have tightened 
the noose around the NGO sector by implementing regulatory laws. Changes in the FCRA act regulating 
the international financial flows which the other sets of literature review also mention in this document, 
make it more difficult for NGOs to function autonomously. In this context, CSOs are seen as unlikely to 
be in a position of ‘gaining autonomy from the state in the near future’ (Kilby, 2011: 194). 
3) There is also the argument that civil society in India is restricted to a small section of citizens, 
primarily the middle classes who speak the ‘language of rights,’ whereas it is the poor who have the 
greatest need for voicing their daily struggles within the political society (Chandhoke 2011: 179; 
Chatterjee, 2007: 57). For Chatterjee, the ‘political society’ is the space where marginalized groups 
negotiate with the state. Making a distinction between corporate and non-corporate capital, Chatterjee 
views civil society as the space where corporate capital is hegemonic and political society as the space of 
management of the non-corporate (Chatterjee 2007; see also Sahoo 2013). 
4) There are several organizations that represent particular communities and challenge the rights of 
other communities. Their resorting to undemocratic methods raises uncomfortable questions regarding 
India’s plurality and threatens core values of citizenship and equality (Chandhoke, 2011). The close and 
proximate relationship between the state and some of these organizations has taken the autonomy 
debate to a completely different platform. This has questioned the existence of civil society as an agent 
of transformative change, and instead as an instrument of the state to implement undemocratic 
practices. 
Although these arguments have been proposed, they are generally not backed by extensive empirical 
research exploring their deeper significance for future CSO collaborations, funding and support. Most of 
the discussions deal with the restricted character of CSO autonomy. There is not much to suggest how 
civil society operates within the restrictive space available to it. Also, the question of how the level of 
autonomy changes vis-à-vis the state when CSOs operate not as individual agents but as collaborations 
(e.g. networks) has not been addressed adequately. Additionally, studies have been conducted that 
address autonomy at the level of CSOs, but they are largely restricted to NGOs, which constitute only a 
part of the civil society landscape (Kilby, 2011).  
To build on the existing literature on civil society’s autonomy vis-à-vis the state, we see the following 
issues as particularly relevant: 
1) The civil society space in India is diverse (see also chapter 6), making it important to move beyond the 
restrictive space of NGOs and examine other organizations that are part of civil society. There is 
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currently limited literature exploring autonomy and the state from the perspectives of different types of 
CSOs. 
2) The question of the autonomy of CSOs vis-à-vis the state has most often been studied as a one-on-
one relationship between certain types of organizations and the state. It is therefore important to 
investigate the autonomous character of CSOs working as networks and to locate autonomy within the 
network of relationships that exist among CSOs.  
 
Marketization of civil society: Impact on autonomy 
The requirements and needs of both the private sector (open market) and CSOs have shaped the 
relations between them. Two developments have affected civil society’s autonomy in view of its relation 
with the private sector. First, the emergence of corporate social responsibility (CSR), and second, New 
Public Management. It has given rise to a results and outcome based understanding of the social causes 
and forces that civil society seeks to influence. 
CSR and the autonomy of civil society 
Through CSR, the private sector has made its presence felt in areas such as health, the environment, and 
education. The corporate sector has opened its own non-profit ventures and collaborated with existing 
non-profit organizations to deliver certain services or to enable the local population to gain the skills 
necessary to access basic resources. An example of this is the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation and the 
programs they have initiated in Africa and Asia to support causes close to their vision. In this way, the 
private sector has entered a space that was formerly viewed as belonging to civil society. The non-profit 
sector has also relied on the corporate and private sectors for funding and resources to provide services 
and function in a competitive environment, where there are many organizations operating 
simultaneously (Eikenberry and Kluver 2004). 
Over the years, private businesses have begun to feel pressure to ‘engage in practices that go beyond 
profit maximization and pursue broader social benefits for external constituencies’ (Arenas, Sanchez and 
Murphy, 2013: 723). In India, collaboration between the corporate world and civil society has become 
even more entrenched, as the Companies Bill now ‘mandates […] CSR spending. There is a legal motive 
as companies must ensure that they spend 2 per cent of their net profits towards CSR initiatives’ (Sabat, 
2015: 71). Private-sector organizations therefore form alliances with a CSO (or, more often, an NGO) to 
implement some of its goals to meet the requirements for CSR. Although pressure is exerted by CSOs 
because they are now better able to organize and strategize, this does not necessarily mean a 
relationship of conflict between CSOs and the private sector. Private companies devise ways to 
collaborate with CSOs with the aim of moving away from confrontation. A situation of conflict means 
that private companies have to allocate resources to overcoming these conflicts, and they would prefer 
to utilize these resources elsewhere. These are alliances situated within the category of ‘strategic 
partnerships,’ which are expected to benefit both businesses and CSOs (Ashman, 2001; Waddell, 2000). 
Literature suggests that civil society is at greater risk and that in reality these partnerships are not 
mutually beneficial (Ashman, 2001). A number of studies related to CSO–business partnerships in South 
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Africa, Brazil, and India have found that the CSOs felt that the benefits to corporations’ image outweigh 
or even whitewash destructive practices carried out by the private companies. (Hamann and Acutt, 
2010; Carron, Thomsen, Chan, Muro and Bhushan, 2006) The partnership has implications for the 
autonomy of CSOs, as they may not call attention to such practices of private companies with which 
they are in partnership. It becomes difficult for CSOs to hold the private sector accountable to terms of 
social responsibility in the way they would have done without the collaboration. Additionally, 
collaboration may lead to CSOs giving up particular styles of functioning to ensure that they are able to 
receive funding from the private sector. These potential outcomes are directly linked to CSO autonomy.3 
Collaborations in South Africa, Latin America, and, in some cases, even India, suggest a complex set of 
issues emerging when private firms collaborate with CSOs. The CSO–corporate relationship still seems to 
be an ‘uneasy and uncertain one’ (Goswami and Tandon, 2013: 660). There is evidence to suggest that 
both CSOs and businesses add new physical and structural capacity through collaborations. Situations of 
joint ownership emerge, creating new opportunities for both sides (Waddell, 2000: 11). However, 
although relationships between CSOs and the private sector may be mutually beneficial and strategically 
forged, these relationships cannot be viewed as equal. Private firms have control over the financial 
resources in joint collaborative initiatives, complicating the independent functioning of CSOs. Further, 
various stakeholders develop new perceptions of CSOs in their role as players in the CSR movement 
(Arenas, Lozano and Albareda, 2009: 176). 
New Public Management and civil society 
The close proximity of the market and CSOs is related to changes that occurred worldwide in the early 
1990s as a result of the economic crisis and liberalization. The slowing down of the economy and the 
need to change the functioning mechanism of the government to be more efficient and performance-
based resulted in changes in CSOs as well. CSOs were increasingly ‘expected to prove performance—
efficiency, effectiveness and quality’ (Brandsen, Trommel and Verschuere, 2017: 679). The state seemed 
to decline, with the market emerging as the new force to be reckoned with, and, consequently, civil 
society became the space for social reconstruction (Ghosh, 2009). This phenomenon appeared in most 
parts of the world, but it took a forceful shape in developing countries whose economies were 
undergoing changes of great magnitude. It contributed to the ‘NGOization’ and ‘professionalization’ of 
civil society, which matched with ‘the neoliberal agenda of government roll back and decentralization’ 
(Ghosh, 2009: 229).  
These developments influence the modalities of functioning of CSOs. The field of development and civil 
society has come to be ‘dominated by professionalized NGOs, often sponsored and funded by donor 
agencies in the West’ (Chandhoke, 2012: 43). The professionalization has implications for the 
functioning of CSOs, as they are expected to work in a project-based manner, with fixed targets and 
deliverables in mind. All of this is indicative of a corporate way of functioning, which impacts the 
autonomy of CSOs and the people working within them. Although functioning in a target-based manner 
gives CSOs a professional image, it detaches the people working in them from the ‘cause’ they work for, 
                                                 
3 See Ashman’s work on ‘Civil Society Collaboration with Business: Bringing Empowerment Back In’ (2001). . She brings into focus 
civil society–business collaborations in three countries: Brazil, South Africa, and India. She points out that a Brazilian CSO (the 
Brazil Vocational Institute), while partnering with a business firm, closed one of its social programs that was not financially sound. 
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with an aim toward profit rather than building social capital (Eikenberry and Kluver, 2004). Thus, the 
sense of autonomy seems to be diminished when CSOs operate as businesses organizations with market 
ideals. To date, the market–civil society relationship in India largely remains unexplored. 
The autonomy of CSOs cannot be discussed in isolation and is connected to the concept of ownership. 
These two concepts complement each other in more than one ways. Whereas autonomy is situated in 
the idea of freedom and choice, ownership is rooted in a sense of responsibility. The two concepts are 
connected as rights or freedom is to obligation. The boundaries between the two concepts are often 
blurred and a sense of ownership might be difficult to flourish without autonomy. Therefore the next 
section explores the idea of ownership that emerges in relation to civil society and tries to bring forward 
the complexities related to it.  
 
Ownership 
 
Defining ownership 
Ownership in development discourse pertains to responsibility and norms within partnerships. It can be 
defined as the idea ‘that societies as well as persons assume the responsibility for their own 
development’ (Muller, 2009: 6), so they also take on the authority and responsibility to make final 
decisions regarding the owned object or process (Cramer, Stein and Weeks, 2006: 421). Ownership 
creates certain favorable conditions for partnerships where two or more parties share similar rights and 
recognition. Ambiguities arise when ownership is translated from theory to practice, as a wide range of 
meanings become attached to the term, ranging from the ‘relationship between stakeholders, to a 
sense of attachment to a programme, to actual control’ (Chesterman, 2007: 3). Therefore, the 
operationalization of ownership takes several forms, based on the context and interpretation (Carner, 
Stein and Weeks, 2006). 
Exploring ownership: Moving from ‘country ownership’ to ‘democratic ownership’ 
Ownership has been a key concept in development discourse for over 20 years (De Jong, Megens and 
Waal, 2011; Meyer and Schulz, 2008. The concept was discussed as a central component of multilateral 
development aid in a policy document entitled ‘Development Partnerships in the New Global Context,’ 
adopted by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development’s Development and 
Assistance Committee in 1995 (Chesterman, 2007). This policy document suggested that, for 
development to succeed, the people in the countries where assistance was given should be the ‘owners’ 
of their development policies and programs (Chesterman, 2007). Countries were expected to be in the 
‘driver’s seat’ in terms of determining and achieving their own development goals (Wolfensohn, 1999). 
The Paris Declaration of 2005 reshaped the delivering of aid and the relationship between donors and 
recipients (Meyer and Schulz, 2008). One of the aims of this document was to change the vocabulary of 
the donor–recipient relationship, viewed in terms of ‘partnerships’ (Meyer and Schulz, 2008). The 
ownership principle in aid effectiveness lies at the heart of the Paris Declaration (Zimmermann, 2007). 
The document defined ownership in the context of developing countries exercising ‘effective leadership 
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over their development policies and strategies’ (Zimmermann, 2007: 3). To unpack this idea further, 
‘The idea of ownership is to grant more control over aid flows and development policy to recipient 
country governments. If aid money is channeled through country systems, rather than through parallel 
governance structures, developing country governments will have more power to determine how those 
resources are spent and how they fit with other spending’ (De Jong, Megens and Waal, 2011). 
There has been an intense debate on two aspects of ownership in development aid: country-based 
ownership and democratic/inclusive ownership. At the center of this debate, is the control that a 
government has over the aid coming from donors for developmental change and the question of 
whether country-based ownership is effective in development initiatives. The Paris Declaration spoke of 
a consensus on development policies to be nurtured and formulated. The consensus was to emerge 
among the donors, partnering governments, civil society partners, and other stakeholders. The 
Declaration called for greater participation of the citizens in voicing their concerns and implementing 
the aid program. However, the Declaration also recognized the need for a strong government able to 
deliver results. This became the context for a critical perspective on the Paris Declaration and the 
understanding of ‘country ownership.’ 
Overall, the discussion on ownership in the Paris Declaration (2005) and the Accra Declaration (2008) 
suggests that the international discourse links ownership to the state and envisions development to be 
state-driven, with the stakes of the program in the hands of the government (Tomlinson, 2011). When 
aid reaches the ground, however, several forms of ownership not envisioned by the Paris Declaration, or 
even the later Accra Declaration, are reinforced.4 The ownership of aid programs implemented in each 
country is based on several factors, including the relationship between the donors, partnering 
governments, CSOs, citizens, and other stakeholders. The idea of ownership is intrinsically political and 
ambiguous. There are those who maintain that ownership has to be considered with recognition for the 
rights of the grassroots, local groups and of the people, which are compromised in the wake of ‘power 
imbalances within the transnational civil sphere’ (Pieck and Moog, 2009, p. 416). In some cases, 
ownership is articulated in the context of inclusive ownership, described as ‘real ownership leading to 
genuine development effectiveness’ (Gloeckl, 2011). 
Ownership: Challenges and opportunities for CSOs 
In the post-Paris Declaration analysis of ownership, two issues strongly emerge. One is a narrow vision 
of country ownership that the Declaration seemed to legitimize. Here, ownership was largely viewed as 
‘ownership by government officials in dialogue with donor officials’ (Tomlinson, 2011: 12). The 
Declaration has been critiqued for its failure to be inclusive or to address important issues such as 
‘human rights, gender equality, decent work and accountability for sustainable outcomes for poor and 
vulnerable people’ (Tomlinson, 2011: 12). The critique centers on the definition of ownership, which 
some in the Southern countries felt was donor-driven and lacked an assessment of the factors important 
in defining the concept from their perspective. The most significant critique that emerged was about 
how country ownership was understood as a ‘property of the conditionality attached with it’ (Buiter, 
                                                 
4 See Meyer and Schulz (2008), who analyze the concept of ownership emerging from the Paris Declaration through a case study 
analysis of cases of ‘subversive ownership’ in Mali, ‘counterproductive ownership’ in Nicaragua, ‘alignment in ownership’ in Peru, 
and ‘strong ownership’ in Vietnam. 
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2007: 647). Country ownership did not recognize the heterogeneity of populations. Rather, it assumed 
their homogeneity when speaking of representation from governments, certain organizations, and lobby 
groups. 
The second issue concerns attaching ownership to development aid effectiveness. Although there is an 
emphasis on shared ownership, it becomes a precondition for development effectiveness, based on an 
assumption that ownership will contribute to effectiveness (Arensman, Van Wessel and Hilhorst, 2017). 
A related aspect is the power imbalance created because of different forms of conditionality affecting 
ownership in ‘partner’ countries. Donor policies have made governments receiving aid accountable to 
these donors and have discouraged them from engaging with their citizens in formulating policies for 
development. This has brought about significant problems related to the level of ownership a 
government or recipient organization can claim over a development program. A significant connection 
between ownership and autonomy emerges from this discussion: Aid is attached to conditionality 
through ownership, which affects the autonomy of partner organizations. 
The discussions about ownership and the related partnerships tend to focus on results-based 
ownership, which connects the concept to effectiveness. There also appears to be a connection 
between aid effectiveness, ownership, and New Public Management, which stresses efficiency and 
professionalization. Although the idea of ownership tends to make development goals more inclusive, 
there is also a fear that it serves the interests of hegemonic economic systems, given the silence on 
‘unequal market power, consolidating corporate power and local political realities’ (Cornwall and Block, 
2005: 1053). 
The implications of ownership for CSOs need to be interpreted in light of the above discussion. 
Development goals achieved through collaborative efforts will have an impact on ownership (Beier, 
2009: 26), whenever any form of collaboration occurs, at whatever level. Given that ‘there is no 
ownership neutral external cooperation’ (Beier, 2009: 26), there has been an emphasis on 
collaborations that are ownership-sensitive. This calls for an inclusive understanding of ownership, both 
in letter and in spirit. At the international level, there is a consensus on ‘locally owned’ development 
strategies emerging from an ‘open and collaborative dialogue by local authorities with civil society and 
external partners about the shared objectives and their respective contributions to the common 
enterprise’ (Chesterman, 2007: 7). However, there seems to be a problem in arriving at consensus on 
implementing these policies. 
Civil society has certainly carved a role for itself within these partially understood questions on what 
ownership means, how it can be achieved, and the ways to make it more democratic and inclusive. The 
role of the civil society in development can no longer be brushed aside, and, therefore, the ownership 
debate is more vibrant in the context of civil society. In most of the declarations on aid effectiveness 
within development discourse, there is recognition of the role that CSOs ought to play in collaborations 
for development goals. However, there seems to be an ambiguity in locating the CSOs’ ownership within 
development policies. 
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Two associated issues impact ownership when donor agencies enter into collaboration with CSOs. One is 
the issue of representation that CSOs often face. This arises when CSOs are questioned about their 
representation in non-electoral forms that do not have any formal authority. These questions are raised 
because of the complexities involved with representation itself (see also chapter 4). In an endeavor to 
represent, hegemony and hierarchy are often created. In such instances, CSOs and their sense of 
ownership of development polices become problematic. The second issue relates to the inclusive 
character of civil society. Although development discourse emphasizes local ownership and inclusivity in 
development policies, these processes do not seem to happen automatically. For instance, there are 
always groups that tend to be excluded from development initiatives and forced to own programs and 
policies that they did not make. Therefore, it is useful to ask whether ownership can be shared and 
inclusive when collaborations suggest power imbalances, how ownership questions emerge and are 
navigated under such imbalances, and how CSOs navigate power imbalances. 
 
Inclusive development and the role of CSOs 
 
Inclusive development is the working out of development goals with the consideration of the needs of 
the poor and marginalized (excluded) (Chibba, 2008). More specifically, it is defined as ‘development 
that includes marginalized people, sectors and countries in social, political and economic processes for 
increased human well-being, social and environmental sustainability, and empowerment’ (Gupta et al., 
2015: 546). It is important to elaborate further on what inclusiveness means in our perspective. A 
development process is viewed as inclusive when it includes the knowledge and aspirations of local 
communities and enhances their participation in decision-making (Borel-Saladin and Turok, 2013; 
Narayan and Prichett, 2009). Furthermore, inclusiveness stresses the overcoming of the exclusions 
commonly faced by focuses on the poorest (in terms of income), most vulnerable and most marginalized 
in society (see also chapter 4 in this review). 
However, we need to highlight that, at international, national, and local levels, there is a politics to 
inclusive development (Teichman, 2016). This politics relates to hegemonic formation of the concept of 
inclusive development when it is defined in purely economic terms. Such an understanding relates to 
inclusive development only in the context of pure economic change, such as creating employment 
opportunities with ‘universally’ accepted ideas of social inclusion based on interventionist policies 
(Teichman, 2016). It is therefore important to move away from ‘simplistic readings of inclusion and 
instead insist that sustainable and inclusive forms of development involve progressive changes to the 
power relations that underpin poverty and exclusion’ (Hickey, Sen and Bukenya, 2015: 6). Simplistic 
readings of inclusive development can contribute to the disempowerment of weaker groups, including 
women and minority ethnic communities (Hickey, Sen and Bukenya, 2015). 
The above ideas about inclusive development are directly relevant for CSOs’ work. CSOs, as was 
mentioned earlier, collaborate to reach certain long- and short-term objective goals of social justice and 
transformation. In doing so, they engage directly in the business of inclusive development and thus the 
politics surrounding it. For instance, NGOs, which are an important aspect of civil society, receive a 
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‘larger slice of foreign aid and other forms of development finance than ever before’ to achieve some of 
their development goals (Banks et al., 2015: 707). However, for these goals to be translated into the 
empowerment of marginalized people, ‘genuine interactive governance’ is required (Gupta et al., 2015). 
Inclusive development requires participatory approaches and non-discriminatory and equal 
opportunities for participation in society (Gupta et al., 2015). It requires the participation of multiple 
agencies and cannot be achieved by the state, the private sector, or civil society alone. There is a need 
for collaborative approaches to achieve inclusive development, and, as discussed above, these 
collaborations at various levels bring in unique challenges to CSOs’ autonomy and ownership. Among 
several things required for inclusive development, there is a need to build consensus on the policies and 
programs initiated at various levels. The building of consensus is possible through dialogue with civil 
society, making its role crucial for inclusive development. The literature reviewed in the sections above 
relates to different ways in which autonomy and ownership are challenged when CSOs collaborate with 
each other, the state, and the market. In India, there are collaborations at multiple levels among CSOs, 
and it is important to understand whether these collaborations are translated into inclusive 
development. 
 
Implications for our research 
 
The autonomy and ownership debate brings into focus important complexities involved. Reviewing the 
literature on civil society’s autonomy and ownership reinforces that these concepts need to be 
contextualized and explored further considering the unresolved puzzles related to them. The empirical 
research on autonomy and ownership draws from this literature review in the following ways. Firstly, it 
will build on the argument that autonomy and ownership are not absolute and a given but are relative. 
Secondly, we take the starting point that autonomy and ownership are complex, as CSOs are often 
embedded in multiple (possible) relations and collaborations, with autonomy and ownership likely being 
shaped, challenged and navigated from and engagement with these contexts in complex ways.  
The complex ways in which autonomy gets defined vis-à-vis the state, market and civil society gives a 
foundation for this research to be able to relate to them while studying CSO collaborations during the 
empirical research. The same can be suggested for the literature on ownership that moves from 
international debates on the subject to the need for more contextual and inclusive understanding of the 
concept. These arguments would be significant to build on the knowledge that already exists through an 
empirical investigation within a context.  
There is a lot that the literature speaks on important issues pertaining to the two concepts. Yet, there 
are significant knowledge gaps that can become starting points for our research. 1) The autonomy and 
ownership question has been explored in linear and hierarchical power relations with funding relations 
between donor and receiver taking center stage. There is little attention to the other ways in which 
autonomy and ownership questions may emerge, considering the multiple relations and collaborations 
many CSOs engage in. 2) There is a lot of literature that concentrates on the factors constraining 
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autonomy and ownership within the donor dependencies just mentioned (see also chapter 2). There is 
much less attention to the ways CSOS may navigate these constraints. Even when constraints exist, CSOs 
engage in collaborations and navigate different possibilities to achieve certain goals. For example, CSOs 
may weigh the benefits of harnessing the power of CSOS they partner with, and the price they may pay 
in terms of ownership. Or they may give up a measure of autonomy in their approach of issues to gain 
access to state arenas. And in some cases, CSOs may also actively seek to avoid constraining other CSOS 
that they work with and develop strategies to do so.  
To what extent autonomy and ownership are considerations for CSOs, and whether and how they may 
be addressed by them, is poorly understood. When we take autonomy and ownership seriously as 
fundamental traits of a functioning civil society, we need to do justice to the complexity we find in 
reality. This chapter will inform our research of:  
1. The extent and way in which questions of autonomy and ownership emerge for CSOs in the shaping of 
their representative roles. 
2. The relative role and connections between autonomy and ownership in CSO in the shaping of their 
representative roles.  
3. The way CSOs confront and navigate autonomy and ownership in their representative roles. 
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Chapter 4. Representation 
 
Introduction 
 
In a developing country like India, civil society organizations play a significant role in bringing out the 
voices of marginalized groups and ensuring their visibility in the development discourse, political debate 
and policy processes. Different types of CSOs encourage the mobilization, participation, and inclusion of 
marginalized groups and their representation by navigating multiple challenges and making spaces for 
an inclusive society. Through advocacy and policy reform, civil society organizations also protect the 
rights of marginal groups, enhancing their bargaining power and helping them to overcome their lack of 
voice and injecting these voices into mainstream discourse of decision-making.  
The Dialogue and Dissent Theory of Change assumes CSOs can address the needs of the marginal and 
vulnerable group and can represent their voices (Kamstra, 2017), through representative roles 
articulating and amplifying people’s voices and address inequalities. However, when CSOs represent a 
section of society, they represent a broad spectrum of diverse groups and their concerns, translating 
these into constructions of constituencies and their views and interests. Therefore, understanding CSOs 
representation requires understanding of the ways in which representations take shape in diverse 
settings.  
When it comes to India, with its multi-layered social-political structure, it is particularly important to 
deepen our insights into the ways in which representation is imagined and takes shape, and the 
implications of locally relevant civil society diversities for inclusiveness. Understanding that 
representation is constructed by CSOs embedded in relations and context, in our project we zoom in on 
’the intrinsic plurality of the meanings and forms of political representation’ (Lama-Rewal, 2016), as it 
takes shape through diverse CSOs representing marginal and vulnerable sections of Indian society.  
This chapter is divided into four sections. The first section highlights theoretical aspects of 
representation, presenting a brief discussion on the notion of representation, different types of 
representations, and representative claims with an emphasis on non- electoral representation. The 
second section extends the understanding of representation by placing it in the Indian context. The third 
section dwells upon the key concepts of inclusion and exclusion in the Indian context, discussing locally 
relevant civil society diversities. The fourth section zooms in on construction and representation of 
marginal and vulnerable sections of society, and their implications. The final section articulates the ways 
in which we draw on the above literature and add to the knowledge with our research. 
 
Representation theory 
 
One of the most cited and influential representation scholars, Hanna Pitkin (1967) provides a simple 
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definition of representation, saying that to represent is simply to ‘make present again’. Political 
representation is a process of making citizens’ concerns, voices, opinions, and perspectives ‘present’ in 
public policy-making processes. Developing her conceptualization, Pitkin describes the concept of 
representation in two ways: ‘acting for’ (a person) and ‘standing for’ (a person or object). Pitkin (1967) 
writes that representation means ‘acting in the interest of the represented, in a manner responsive to 
them’ (p.209). She further identifies four different kinds of representation, each one with a particular 
understanding to approach representation. These are formalistic representation, descriptive 
representation, symbolic representation, and substantive representation. Formalistic representation is 
about institutional arrangements and the institutional position of representative needed to represent 
citizens. Descriptive and symbolic representation can be put together as a mode of ‘standing for’ for the 
people that it represents. Such forms of representation introduce the perspectives and experiences of 
marginal and vulnerable groups into representative institutions (Mansbridge 2003, Young 2000). In 
substantive representation, representatives serves the best interests of their constituents by ‘acting for’, 
in the interests of the people they represent.  
In Pitkin’s writing, there is an emphasis focusing upon the representative and what makes them 
representative. Saward (2006) problematizes Pitikin’s emphasis on representativeness. According to 
Saward, this is a unidirectional approach that underplays the subtle processes of constructing the 
represented or that which needs to be represented (p.10). For Saward, representation is a 
communicative process centred on the construction of representative claims made by actors seeking to 
represent, and the back-and-forth on this with the groupings those actors claim to represent through 
these claims. According to Saward, the representative claim helps us to ‘…grasp the importance of 
performance to representation; take non-electoral representation seriously; and to underline the 
contingency and contestability of all forms of representation’ (Saward, 2006, p.297). Saward (2010) 
further argues that ‘the representative claims encompass and implicate many different groups and 
individuals; they show that representation is dynamic, shifting, and elusive… (p.1)’. 
In contemporary times, due to the increasing role of non-governmental actors at international, national 
and local levels, Saward’s notion of representative claims emerges as a significant step that can help 
scholars and practitioners seeking to examine and advance representation as a potential contributor to 
inclusive development. Saward’s (2010) notes that representation can be invoked by a mix of non-
elected actors, who offer ‘a construction of constituency to an audience’ (p. 49). Going back to Pitkin’s 
formulation of representative, the role of non-state actors and civil society organizations can be 
classified as non- electoral representatives who can ‘speak for’, ‘act for’ and ‘stand for’ on behalf of 
individuals or marginal groups - or simply put, who have ‘the capacity to act’ and ‘(re)present their 
voices’.  
Seeing the increasing presence of CSOs and changing political realities, the role of non- electoral 
representation is increasingly being acknowledged. Writing about the significance of non- electoral 
representation, Rubenstein (2014) states that the advocacy work done by CSOs has not gone unnoticed, 
and has been considered as a ‘paradigmatic example of ‘non-electoral representation’ (206). In her 
article ‘Rethinking representation’, Mansbridge (2003) suggests a need to revisit our conceptual 
understanding of political representation. According to Mansbridge’s empirical work, there may be 
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more than one way of representation, and she states that, ‘the criteria are plural rather than singular’ 
(515). In line with this, Mansbridge argues for ‘including both elected and non-elected representatives, 
inside and outside the legislature’ in our understanding of representation (2011: 621).  
One of the scholars who have since then picked up this discussion, combining constructed and non-
electoral representation in her analysis of representation, Maia (2012) states that non-electoral political 
representatives have a fundamental role in democratic politics as they claim to represent interests and 
aspirations and act in the name of women, ethnic groups, disabled groups, gays and lesbians, the poor, 
animals or ‘the environment’ (p.429, emphasis in original). For Maia, this can be the case ‘although 
[these representatives] are not elected or formally nominated, and may not even participate in 
deliberative forums directly with those concerned themselves’ (ibid). According to Maia (2012), social 
movement networks and NGOs can be best understood as ‘discursive representatives’, engaged in 
dynamics of making, contesting, supporting a claim of representation (p.430). So far, this scholarly line 
of debate and research has hardly been picked up in development studies. However, in the Indian 
context, considering the prevailing plurality of the society, the idea of making representative claims on 
behalf of marginal and vulnerable groups becomes even more complex and, considering the persistent 
inequalities of Indian society, potentially of important value for inclusive development.  
 
Representation in India 
 
As a representative democracy with multi-party system, The Indian political landscape is one where 
various political actors claim to represent the views and interests of the society. Jayal (2016) writes: ‘the 
popular narrative of Indian democracy presents it as a series of feel-good clichés: a vibrant political 
arena, populated by a multiplicity and diversity of political parties, offering a smorgasbord of political 
choices’(174). And indeed, in recent years, many political parties and social movements have emerged 
speaking on behalf of citizens to (re)present them; especially in the case of backward castes and 
marginalized sections of Indian society. However, the dynamics involved are complex and not evidently 
moving towards inclusiveness. Over time different contradictory dynamics come in. For example, the 
Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) has embraced the cause of representing the Dalits, which can be considered 
as an example of descriptive representation, advancing a marginalized section of society. In line with 
such developments, Yadav (2000) coined the phrase ‘the second democratic upsurge’, asserted that 
Indian democracy experienced a deepening by becoming more representative of social diversity. The 
core understanding behind this was that the ‘socially underprivileged’ had become the most active 
participants in elections during this phase. However, widening social, economic and political gaps and 
changing dynamics among other caste groups also have had the adverse effects on the politics of 
representation. The 2009 general elections marked a reversal of the trend of increasing representation 
of the underprivileged, indicating an increased participation of the upper middle and middle classes and 
a fall in the share of marginalized groups. The recent 2014 general elections confirmed this reversal, 
where electoral participation of socio-economically marginalized went further down, and the 
participation of the upper middle and middle classes went up from 26 percent to 47 percent (Lama-
 50 
 
Rewal 2016; Jaffrelot and Verniers, 2015). In line with this, we see an increase of upper caste 
representation, and a decrease of lower caste and Muslim representation.  
Different studies illustrate the plurality of representation in India. Michelutti’s (2004) study of the 
Yadavs, as the members of one of the largest caste communities in the Indian state of Uttar Pradesh, 
assert their linkages with democracy through political participation, including activism. In such cases 
representative claims emerge out of institutional and collective conditions. Blom Hansen (2004) reflects 
upon what he calls the ‘politics of presence’ of regional political party Shiv Sena. He argues that ‘a 
politics of the spectacle’ is central to political representation here, and that Shiv Sena employs ‘politics 
of presence’ as an essential feature of representative claims-making – ‘from the local street corner to 
mass meeting to the staging of policies through the state government’ (p.21). Both studies highlight that 
the practices of representation construct communities and localities through the very act of 
representation, embedded in specific contexts.  
The contemporary Indian political landscape demonstrates a mix of different forms of electoral 
representation. In addition, with the rise of new political actors and social movements, representation 
has come to include populist politics as used by Aam Aadmi Party (AAP). Non-electoral representation is 
evident and clearly also performing representative roles. Partly this can be gathered from chapter 6 the 
composition of Indian civil society. Here we want to emphasize the diversity of forms of representation 
that such civil society organizing can entail. Looking beyond civil society advocacy, emphasizing the 
plurality of representation, we can point here to many different types of initiatives. One is the newly 
founded Dalit-rights organization Bhim Army in Western Uttar Pradesh, which is working with an aim ‘to 
be a voice for the voiceless’ by establishing schools to educate children from the most marginalized 
sections of the society (Rajvanshi 2018).  
Another example is that of successful campaigning by a group of CSOs, along with some regional and 
indigenous groups and local political leadership against the Coca-Cola-Company. These protests resulted 
in the closure of its bottling factory after accusations of water depletion and pollution (Berglund, 2017).  
 Another example illustrating diversity is the formation and role of the Justice Verma Committee that 
was constituted after the Nirbhaya rape case5 as a direct consequence of the rape and subsequent 
outrage and public protest throughout India. The outcomes of the committee formed the basis of the 
Criminal Law (Amendment) Act of 2013 (Shakil, 2013). Such dynamics between state institutions, non-
state actors, and CSOs highlight that Indian democracy is incredibly fluid, situational and dynamic 
(Hansen, 2004), with evident roles to play for civil society representation, in multiple forms. It is against 
the backdrop of such various forms of representation, in a dynamic political context, that we approach 
our study of the way civil society’s representative roles take shape.  
  
                                                 
5 In 2012, a 23-year-old girl was gang-raped and later brutally killed in Delhi. This incident triggered massive protests in India. 
See thequint.com (n.d.).  
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Inclusion and exclusion 
 
The Dialogue and Dissent Theory of Change states that ‘the added value of CSOs…also lies in addressing 
the root-causes of poverty by challenging the underlying mechanisms of social, economic and political 
exclusion’ (p.5). The Dialogue and Dissent Theory of Change also takes the starting point that CSOs can 
contribute to inclusive and sustainable development by articulating voices of the people. These 
assumptions encourage us to observe how CSOs represent the ‘voices and visibility’ and challenge the 
exclusion of marginal groups to ensure their participation in inclusive processes.  
By incorporating and promoting the voices of Dalits, women and other subaltern groups, CSOs ensure 
the participation of marginalized groups and challenge a system based on the exclusion. It is also proven 
that in the efforts of representing marginal voices, CSOs provide a support system and do in face 
sometimes facilitate negotiations with the state or other socio-political institutions. Such efforts lead to 
their participation in democratic processes by staking claims in inclusive processes and challenging the 
exclusionary practices. For example, many NGOs have argued to adopt human rights framework 
upholding rights of Dalits and protecting them from caste-based violence. Another example could be 
advocacy on behalf of a particular community that is excluded from certain processes based on the 
religion or ethnicity. Similarly, there are many NGOs which are involved in implementing the policy like 
Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme ensuring that the people from most 
marginalized communities and poorest of poor get equal opportunities in such welfare schemes. 
There are many ways in which CSOs can constitute their representative role in addressing existing 
inequalities by demanding inclusion of marginal and vulnerable sections of society, with widely diverging 
implications for inclusiveness.  For example, Ray (1999) shows how in the cities of Calcutta and Bombay, 
representation of women’s rights by party-affiliated and autonomous women’s groupings differ in 
important ways, depending the different organizational space for articulating women’s rights, and on 
the different local political contexts. ‘Feminism’ obtains highly diverging legitimacy and prominence 
here.  
However, Chandhoke (1995), a prominent scholar of Indian civil society, offers a more critical 
perspective. She writes that social movements such as Narmada Bachao Andolan6 and Chhattisgarh 
Mukti Morcha7 were the creative movement of India’s civil society, but the civil space in actually existing 
democracies like India offers only limited possibilities for those without capacities or entitlements or 
those who are outside the organized sectors. According to Chandhoke (2003), civil society functions as 
both inclusive and exclusionary as it privileges the politically and economically organized groups of 
society. Relatedly, Chatterjee (2008) argues that in India, particular sections of society do not have the 
                                                 
6 Narmada Bachao Andolan are a social movement consisting of adivasis, farmers, environmentalists and human rights 
activists. The movement opposes construction of large dams being built across the Narmada River and demands a proper 
resettlement and rehabilitation plan to accommodate the displaced people. For further details may see 
http://www.narmada.org/ 
7 Shankar Guha Niyogi founded the Chhattisgarh Mukti Morcha in 1982. CMM was established as a political party, a union of 
agricultural laborers, organized industrial mine workers, and Adivasis in the Indian state of Chhattisgarh. Source: 
http://sanhati.com/shankar-guha-niyogi-archives/  
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same agency as others. While higher classes can be included in civil society, having an ordered and 
regulated access to the state, ‘Those in political society make their claims on government, and in turn 
are governed, not within the framework of stable constitutionally defined rights and laws, but rather 
through temporary, contextual and unstable arrangements arrived at through direct political 
negotiations…the bulk of the population in India lives outside the orderly zones of proper civil society. 
(p.57)’. Shah, however (2014) critiques Chatterjee’s position and argues that Chatterjee fails to ‘to see 
the massive mobilization of marginalized sections, Dalits, Adivasis, women and the poor, which has 
happened very much within the framework of stable constitutionally defined rights and laws’ (37).  
In the light of above discussion, we conclude that, while representation of marginal and vulnerable 
sections of society may contribute to inclusive development, it is essential to examine practices of 
representation and the ways these may challenge exclusions and advance inclusion. This is particularly 
important in light of the diverse ideological, organizational and social relations we find between 
representatives (in our case CSOs) and those they claim to represent. Here we draw on, and seek to 
advance, research on the constructed nature of representation, and its implications for inclusiveness. In 
Inclusion and Democracy, Iris Marion Young (2000) stresses that attempts to include more voices in the 
political arena can suppress other voices. Young’s understanding of representation encourages us to 
recognize the plurality or existing diversities of those being represented and draws our attention to that 
what is represented by representatives. It is also necessary to understand that people always have 
multiple identifications and affiliations, and they occupy different positions based on difference and 
ascribed roles which may also overlap with each other. Urbinati (2000) suggests that in such cases 
representation also constitutes ‘comprehensive filtering’ that refines the plurality of aspirations and 
opinions of a given group (p.760). However, what is needed for the comprehensive filtering is a context, 
shared awareness of belonging and mutual interests, perspectives of people shaped by their positions, 
and an ability to translate their experiences of differences into a collective form. An understanding of 
such ‘comprehensive filtering’, and underlying meanings and discourses of representation may help us 
to examine ‘politics of inclusion’ or ‘practices of exclusion’ through a bottom-up and context specific 
approaches. In The Problem of Speaking for Others, Alcoff (1991) problematizes the nuances, problems, 
and difficulties of speaking on behalf of others. She writes about speakers’ epistemological locations and 
the ability to transcend her location when speaking for others. More recently, Maia (2012) shows the 
crucial role of non-electoral representatives in translating issues, constructing constituencies and their 
organization, and creating causes resources and a structure of opportunities that raise public awareness 
and exert influence. Such apprehensions beg the questions like: how do the diverse ways in which this 
happens be understood, and how can implications for inclusiveness be assessed and addressed? What 
can be done to we ensure the plurality of voices and the inclusion of interests and perspectives from the 
margins? In our project, we zoom in on the nature, diversity and implications of the way marginal and 
vulnerable sections of society get represented by CSOs (zooming in on a set of women’s rights CSOs and 
a set of CSOs active in disaster risk reduction). Both sets work extensively with these two concepts. 
Below, we address how these concepts emerge and are approached in our project. 
Marginality  
Marginality is a commonly used concept among CSOs involved in advocacy, in India as elsewhere, with 
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advocacy commonly seeking to articulate and overcome marginality. As a consequence of embedded 
social position, weak political linkages and absence of representation, marginalized groups face denial of 
several services, lack of access to various spaces (e.g. the public sphere), and deprivation of 
opportunities to exercise their skills and potential. Such limitations confine their growth, curtail their 
participation in democratic processes and exclude them from practices of inclusive development mainly 
because they are underrepresented or their visibility in public discourse is low or trivial. Therefore, 
marginalized groups face multiple impediments in their lives due to their socio-cultural identity and 
absence of representation at both the levels of the electoral and non- electoral representation. It is in 
this direction that CSOs seek to empower communities to carve their spaces in mainstream politics or 
social development by mobilizing marginalized groups at the grassroots level.  
Such mobilization has been common in India, as several leading scholars have argued in the past. 
Omvedt (1994), writing about peasants, Dalits, and women’s groups asserts that by mobilizing new 
political identities, these groups have challenged the state on the local, regional and national level. 
Taking the starting point that grassroots organizing can contribute to political power, she argues that 
NGOs working with Dalit groups could negotiate with the state because of their strong grassroots 
networks. Other scholars of India have made related claims, e.g. state that civil society incorporates a 
‘network of voluntary, self-governing institutions in all walks of life’ and that collectively, these 
organisations provide the ‘grassroots model of mass politics... in which people are more important than 
the state’ (Kothari, 1988 cited in Mahajan 1999, p. 1193). 
In the current project, however, we seek to advance our understanding of the nature and implications of 
representation, rather than taking objectified conceptualizations of represented categories as given. 
This is important, firstly considering the wide diversity of representations of marginality and 
marginalization that we find. Secondly, it is important considering that while civil society organizations 
have been playing a vital role in the process of the ‘nation-building’, marginal and vulnerable sections of 
society are still struggling to be a part of mainstream development in India. Moreover, marginal groups 
still appear to have very little participation in presenting representative claims on their own or in 
registering their voices and concerns in public domain. And thirdly, categories like ‘marginal’ and 
‘marginalized’, common in development discourse and practice, as also in the representative practices 
of CSOs in India, are themselves social constructions. When it comes to India, marginalization can be 
diversely defined on the basis of caste, class, ethnicity, religion, gender, etc. Similarly, marginalized 
groups may consist of women, people with disabilities, ethnic minorities, linguistic minorities, caste, 
tribes, etc. However, to define or to categorize ‘marginal’ or ‘marginalized’ in definitive terms is 
problematic. It is a multidimensional, dynamic and context-specific phenomenon. Further, 
categorizations are made by organizationally, socially, politically, culturally and economically diversely 
positioned actors (cf. Weldon 2011).  
Vulnerability 
Many CSOs engaged in development advocacy base and legitimize their role in their representation of 
vulnerable groupings. Just like representation of marginality, representation of vulnerability is complex. 
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This is because vulnerability is multidimensional, dynamic and context-specific phenomenon, and its 
nature is not a given.  
CSOs carry out the role of representing the vulnerable in domains as diverse as climate change 
adaptation, health, and disaster risk reduction, with the final one being taken as our project case.  
In general terms, Adger (2006) defines vulnerability as the state of susceptibility to harm from exposure 
to stresses associated with environmental and social change and from the absence of capacity to adapt. 
Therefore, McLaughlin (2011) suggests that vulnerability needs to be looked at from the evolutionary 
‘theory of change’. The change can be continuous, unpredictable, and abrupt (Folke et al., 2005; Green, 
2016). For the vulnerable, the risk is not only from one type of stress but from exposure to multiple 
stresses experienced or anticipated, such as climate change, disasters, and political, social and economic 
reforms (Brooks, 2003; Downing et al., 2005; McLaughlin, 2011). As different sections of the society are 
exposed to different levels of risk and also have a difference in their response, there has been an 
expansion from a dominant emphasis on hazards towards a wider social and environmental context 
(Miller et al., 2010; IPCC, 2014; Kelman et al., 2015). Therefore, unpacking vulnerability requires 
understanding the political, socio-cultural, and economic underpinnings. 
In the context of our project, the political ecology perspective is particularly important. Vulnerability is 
political in nature in two analytically different ways. First, political processes contribute to the material 
production and distribution of vulnerability. Lack of development contributes to vulnerability, while 
certain developmental activities could inadvertently create new risks (O’Brien et al., 2006). Integration 
of measures ‘to reduce risk to the most vulnerable’ in development programmes , is viewed by many, as 
a very important dimension of inclusive and sustainable development. This is because development can 
be elusive, as in the process of achieving it there could be an increase in inequalities (income and asset) 
and harm to the environment. Further, much of the ‘development’ has been shown to increase people’s 
exposure to risk and add to the vulnerability of the poor (Cannon and Müller-Mahn, 2010). Secondly, 
classifying certain groups of people as vulnerable is itself a political act (Sen, 1999; Bankoff, et al., 2004; 
Eakin and Luers 2006; Miller et al., 2010; McLaughlin, 2011), based on understandings of societal 
inequalities, priorities, rights and needs. Poverty, resource depletion, inequality, and marginalization are 
drivers of vulnerability (Adger and Brooks, 2003; McLaughlin, 2011). Poor people tend to be the most 
vulnerable. Secondly, resource depletion leads to vulnerability because nature's capacity to sustain lives 
and livelihoods is eroded (Folke et al., 2002). Thirdly, social inequality is formed through the complex 
interplay of class, gender, and ethnicity contributes to the marginalization of certain groups 
(McLaughlin, 2011). Poverty, resource depletion social inequality and marginalization reduce the 
capacity of individuals, and communities to buffer expected and surprising change, learn and develop in 
a complex world of rapid transformations. This capacity to bounce back or recover from shocks and 
stresses is called resilience (Cannon, 1994; Twiggs, 2004, Folke et al., 2002; Folke, 2016; Keating et al., 
2017). Building resilience offsets the risk and therefore reduces vulnerability (O’Brien et al., 2006). 
The social and cultural processes that trigger vulnerability are embedded in larger processes that are 
expressions of international and national political and economic considerations. Vulnerability is not only 
constructed at one governance scale but simultaneously on multiple scales. Reducing vulnerability is a 
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human rights concern, and protection of vulnerable groups is grounded in various international human 
rights laws and standards (Sarewitz, et al., 2003; Downing et al., 2005; Bizzarri, 2012).  
Finally, institutions, such as informal and formal connections between individuals, organizations, and 
agencies, are important for building the resilience of vulnerable groups. Here, we are particularly 
interested in the role of CSOs in representation of vulnerable groups to facilitate their inclusion. Through 
advocacy, CSOs potentially play an important role in influencing policies and practices on inclusive and 
sustainable development. A significant contribution of CSOs in the governance system is through the 
representation of vulnerable groups in ‘local development planning’. This not only enables reorienting 
resource and information flows to encourage learning, diversity, and flexibility in responding to the 
changes, but also seeks to tackle conflicting policies, uncoordinated field actions, and poor 
implementation of development plans (Bankoff et al., 2004; Nelson and Finan, 2009; Gaillard, 2010).  
As argued above, constructions of vulnerability are political and context-specific in nature, and are made 
by organizationally, socially, politically, culturally and economically diversely positioned actors. It is 
significant to mention here that even though the Global South - Latin America, Africa, and Asia – is at 
high risk, vulnerability in these regions has largely been understood through technocratic perspectives 
which originated in the Global North (Bankoff et al., 2004). Recent initiatives and efforts by national and 
local CSOs in Asia reflect that Southern CSOs can pursue both hearing the voices, and addressing the 
needs and concerns of vulnerable groupings to a relatively higher levels (Shaw and Izumi, 2014). This 
suggests the presence of important differences in, and dynamics in the representative role of CSOs.  
 
Implications for our research: the construction of representation 
 
From our review we conclude that non-electoral representation is now a widely accepted and relevant 
dimension of democracy and inclusive development, and of great importance for the study of the 
representative role of CSOs. We also conclude that this study of non-electoral representation is in an 
early stage, with little empirical work to draw on, with hardly any publications zooming in on CSOs 
working in international development, and the organizational perspectives from which they work. This 
means we see an important knowledge gap. In particular, we find that there is no attention for the role 
of collaboration and embeddedness in relations in the shaping of representative roles. At the same time, 
we find that there is relevant theoretical work available that we can draw on to structure our study of 
representation, in particular work zooming in on representation as plural, and as socially and 
discursively constructed.  
We also found that our approach of representation as socially and discursively constructed, is highly 
valid for the study of representation of marginal and vulnerable groupings in particular, as both 
categorizations are contingent on many factors, including the contextual and organizational dimensions 
that we set out in our introductory chapter. Important here is also the potential political nature and 
significance of CSOs’ employment of both concepts, as charted above. We plan to draw on this review of 
representation to help inform our research of: 
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1. The way diverse CSOs construct the ‘marginal’ or ‘vulnerable’ constituencies they seek to represent, 
and the representation of these (constructed) constituencies, differently. 
2. The way the diversity of these representations can be understood considering CSOs’ organizational 
contexts and their embeddedness in relations and collaborations (with constituents, the state and other 
CSOs), as understood and given shape to by these CSOs. 
3. The implications of diverse representations for the nature and form of CSOs’ representative roles 
advancing inclusive and sustainable development. 
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Chapter 5. The State and Civil Society in India 
 
Introduction 
  
Since the 1970s, civil society has played a vital role in global democratization. Many formerly communist 
and authoritarian regimes have been forced to democratize in response to citizen mobilization. 
According to a recent Freedom House report, since 1974 the number of democratic political systems has 
more than tripled – from 39 to 123 by 2017 (Freedom House, 2018). Owing to its role in democratic 
transition in different parts of the world, civil society has come to be considered an indispensable 
instrument for democratic governance. The argument has been that a robust, strong, and vibrant civil 
society strengthens liberal democracy. As Dettke (1998: x) notes, ‘it is possible to have a market 
economy without democracy, but it is inconceivable to have a democracy without the institutions of civil 
society’.   
Although this assertion is largely true, there are complications to this picture. Most importantly, the 
nature of civil society in a particular society is often dependent on the state; the state directly helps 
shape what kind of civil society may emerge. As Chandhoke (2001: 8) notes, the state provides the 
politico-legal framework and institutionalizes the normative prerequisites of rights, freedom and the 
rule of law, implying that the state has immense power to define which kinds of civil society 
organizations are permissible under law. Thus, in order to understand the nature and functioning of civil 
society, it is important to understand the relationship between civil society and the state in socio-
historical context. In addition, it is important to note that in the Indian context civil society is not a 
monolithic entity; it is essentially pluralistic. Its role has undergone significant transformation not only 
over time but also with the changing nature of state power across different periods. It is therefore 
important to understand the changing nature and relationship of civil society and the state in India in a 
historical perspective.  
The relationship between civil society and economic development is ambiguous as well. Analyzing the 
roles of civil society and specifically the role it can play in advancing inclusive and sustainable 
development, we offer some background on the relationship between the state and civil society, with 
attention to the way we should see this relation as embedded in market structures and market thinking. 
We also zoom in a set of contemporary conditions important for understanding civil society in India. 
Finally, we chart the patterns of concrete engagement between the Indian state and civil society that 
existing literature allows us to identify. This chapter provides a means to understand both the roles of 
civil society in India as they take shape, and are constrained by, their relations with the state.  
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The colonial state and civil society 
 
The British faced difficulties in governing India in the absence of a ‘linking language’ (Kaviraj, 2001). In 
order to govern, the colonial state thus brought educational reforms primarily to create an intermediary 
English educated middle class ‘loyal’ to the British rule (Sahoo, 2013, 40). In this regard, Christian 
missionaries played a vital role. Although the colonial state initially did not support missionary activity 
fearing that it may disturb local religious sensibilities and consequently hinder its economic interest in 
India, it allowed missionaries after 1813 following pressures from the Church of England and the passage 
of the Charters Act. With this, Christian missionary organisations played a major role in social reform, 
welfare and development in the domain of civil society. As Sen (1993, 4) notes, ‘the first voluntary 
efforts in social development were initiated by Christian missionaries’ in the early 1810s and 1820s 
when they started building schools, colleges, dispensaries, and orphanages.  
Influenced by Christian missionary activities and European modernity and often in reaction against 
them, the English educated Indian elites also began similar social reforms and development activities in 
their communities in mid-1820s. The spirit of voluntarism began spreading in different parts of the 
country, resulting in the formation of many associations such as the Brahmo Samaj (1828), the 
Prarthana Samaj (1864), and the Arya Samaj (1875) (see Sahoo, 2013, 40). Raja Ram Mohan Roy and the 
Brahmo Samaj worked to reform child marriage and the sati-system; Ishwar Chandra Vidyasagar 
propagated widow remarriage and education of girls; and Swami Dayanand Saraswati and the Arya 
Samaj opposed child marriage, idol worship, and caste discrimination (Sheth and Sethi, 1991: 51). The 
efforts to bring formal education to women led to the creation of a cadre of female social reformers 
who in turn established girls’ schools and women’s organizations (Deo, 2016). 
Besides socio-religious reforms, Indian elites also mobilised civil society against British rule. Progressive 
and politically conscious Indians became aware of their civil rights and wrote about their experiences of 
discrimination in various newspapers, such as Amrit Bazaar Patrika, the Hindu, Indian Mirror etc. (Sahoo, 
2013: 41). Indian elites also established various voluntary associations to represent their ideas and 
interests. As Sen (1993: 4) notes, ‘the most important organizational offshoot of the nineteenth century 
reform movement and subsequent national consciousness was the establishment of the Indian National 
Congress [INC] in 1885’. Although the INC was created with the objective to mobilize masses against the 
colonial rule, it remained elitist until the 1920s when Gandhi transformed it to an open and inclusive 
mass-based party (Sahoo, 2013: 42).  
After his arrival from South Africa in 1915, Gandhi restructured the INC and mobilised the masses 
through his ‘constructive work’ programs, which emphasised self-support, self-governance and self-
reliance. Gandhi created a network of organisations in diverse fields such as khadi and village industries, 
education, health, agriculture and dairies and animal husbandry to involve the rural poor in the process 
of development as well as the nationalist movement for Independence (Sheth and Sethi, 1991: 51). In 
sum, civil society in colonial India was a combined product of missionary activities, social reforms and 
anti-colonial nationalist movement.  
 63 
 
Although civil society remained elitist for a long period of colonialism, the Gandhian movement played a 
major role in making civil society inclusive, which not only empowered ordinary people through 
constructive work, but also fought against the colonial state for India’s Independence. Gandhi 
emphasized the reorganization of economic activity in response to the British empire’s mercantilist, 
resource extractive policies. Independence in India was simultaneously about achieving political self-
determination and economic self-reliance under his guidance. Unfair trade relations, exploitative tax 
regimes, and the deindustrialization of India were policies enacted by the British that cemented the 
impoverishment of most Indians. Their legacy continues to shape development efforts today. 
Dr Ambedkar, India’s most prominent Dalit leader, was a major critic of Gandhi as he saw him as 
representing caste Hindus alone. Ambedkar and Jinnah- the father of Pakistan- both argued that Gandhi 
and the INC claimed to be far more inclusive than they actually were. Dalits, Muslims, and other 
marginalized groups had to organize their own civil society organizations and use them to mobilize 
politically. At the same time, orthodox Hindus like those of the Hindu Mahasabha, saw the INC and 
Gandhi as being too accommodating of secularism and equality. They were quiescent in the face of 
British colonialism. Even in the colonial period, Indian civil society was diverse and fractious. Some 
groups worked quite amicably with the British state while others opposed it through civil resistance and 
some fought it with violent revolutionary tactics.  
 
The state, civil society and development in postcolonial India  
 
With the end of the colonial rule a strong, democratic state was established in India. Leaders like Nehru 
believed that ‘a strong state was the only way a mass society, which was largely illiterate and poor, 
which held strong ethnic and caste loyalties and was hence ‘incapable’ of thinking for the country, could 
be adequately governed’ (Kamat, 2002: 8). The Nehruvian state thus acted as the ‘protector’ as well as 
the ‘modernizer and liberator’, and was committed to the task of poverty reduction and human 
development (Nandy, 2002). It invited Gandhian organisations to play a leading role in national 
reconstruction and development of ‘village-level civil societies’ (Schneider, 2007). Through its Five Year 
Plans, the state funded many civil society organisations that worked in community and rural 
development through agricultural and livestock programs, health and education, and khadi and village 
industries.8 Thus, during Nehru’s period, Gandhian NGOs played a major role in providing ‘welfare and 
relief’ (Kudva, 2005: 240) and shared a strong and co-operative relationship with the state. The 
continuing emphasis was on using civil society to organize economic growth and development.  
Soon after Nehru, his daughter Indira Gandhi came to power. Her terms led to the criminalization of 
politics, state ineffectiveness in enforcing the rule of law, rising corruption scandals and increasing 
deinstitutionalization (Kohli, 2000). Most importantly, Mrs Gandhi imposed Emergency rule in 1975 and 
                                                 
8 In the First Five Year Plan, the state allocated INR 70 million for 2,128 organizations, but increased the funding significantly to 
INR 233 million to support 6,000 organizations in the Second Plan (Kudva, 2005: 241). 
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suspended the rule of law and democratic process. Several grassroots social movements had emerged in 
response to the failures of the developmental states. Indira Gandhi saw these as threats to her rule. 
Gandhian activists like Jaya Prakash Narayan (known as JP) strongly opposed Mrs Indira Gandhi’s rule 
and mobilised Gandhian workers, NGOs, students and trade union leaders to become actively involved 
in what he referred to as Sampurna Kranti or ‘total revolution’ to bring political change. Realizing the 
role that civil society organisations and peoples’ movements had been playing in subverting her 
government, Mrs Gandhi increased control over NGOs and regulated foreign funding. She believed that 
foreign funding was involved in fuelling anti-state activities in India. She enacted the Foreign 
Contributions Regulation Act in 1976, aimed at maintaining surveillance of foreign funding of NGOs.  
The international system of Cold War rivalries and regular Western interference in the domestic politics 
of states like Iran, Chile, Zaire etc. shaped Mrs Gandhi’s fears. Decolonization had given way to new 
forms of neo-colonialism in which former imperial powers in the West replaced empire with unfair trade 
practices. Conditionalities of the international financial institutions contributed to maintaining their 
dominance (Easterly 2007). India’s position as a non-aligned state with great sympathy with the socialist 
states made it reasonable to imagine that the CIA would be happy to see Mrs Gandhi fall if she could be 
replaced by a more capitalist friendly government. Of course, the forces that opposed her rule were 
actually mostly to the Left of Mrs Gandhi and unlikely to win much American support.   
Following the ending of Emergency rule in 1977, the Janata government came to power. Considering the 
resistance role that civil society organisations had played during the Emergency rule, the government 
increased funding for NGOs (allocated INR 500 million) and provided bureaucratic support. This, 
however, did not last long because Mrs Gandhi returned to power in 1980 and increased control over 
civil society organisations. She amended the FCRA in 1984 making it obligatory for all NGOs receiving 
foreign funds to register themselves with the Home Ministry. She also appointed the Kudal Commission 
in 1981 in retaliation against the Gandhian NGOs that had supported JP during the Emergency rule. 
Thus, during Mrs Gandhi’s rule, civil society was heavily regulated and shared an antagonistic 
relationship with the state. The Janata government included socialists, Gandhian activists, and right-
wing Hindu nationalists. It was the refusal of the latter to dissociate themselves from their own civic 
organizations that eventually led to the fall of the Janata government. The section on Uncivil Society 
discusses them below.  
Following Mrs Gandhi’s assassination in 1984, her son Rajiv Gandhi came to power. He understood the 
problems associated with state-led development approaches and thus encouraged civil society 
organisations to partner with the state in development process. The Rajiv Gandhi government increased 
the funds available to NGOs in the social sector to 2.5 billion rupees, which is five times larger than the 
assistance provided by the Janata government. This increased funding led to the mushrooming of NGOs 
in India. As recent data shows, there are more than 3 million NGOs working in India (Anand, 2015), 
making it ‘the unofficial NGO capital of the world (Parekh, 2001: 703). After Rajiv Gandhi successive 
governments have also encouraged civil society organisations. However, by following the neo-liberal 
conditionalities, these governments have taken active steps that depoliticise civil society (Sahoo 2013a), 
as will be further discussed below.  
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Contemporary conditions 
 
Civil Society and the state under neoliberalism 
In the early 1990s, the international financial institutions worked with the Indian state to make 
significant reforms to the economy. In the past three decades, following liberalization policies, Indian 
economic growth has vastly expanded. GDP was at Rs 5862120 million in 1991. About 25 years later, it 
went upto at Rs 135760860 million, with a growth rate that hovered around 8% per year in that period. 
This contrasted with the growth rate of about 5% in the three previous decades (Rao and Kadam 2016). 
However, the gains from growth have been very unevenly distributed, with income inequalities in India 
vastly rising, while fundamental development issues like poverty and malnutrition remain endemic. The 
World Bank and other aid donors have frequently turned to civil society to help mitigate these 
inequalities. They have argued that NGOs promote transparency, efficiency, innovation, and equality 
(World Bank 1999). Civil society is seen not just as a means of supporting democracy, but also of 
creating sustainable and inclusive growth. However, relying on civil society organizations to work with 
national polities to achieve sustainable and inclusive growth can obscure structural economic relations 
that sustain inequalities internationally and domestically, such as international trade barriers, the 
operations of globally operating financial institutions and enterprises, and domestic politics.  
Since the 1990s, various governments have actively promoted neo-liberal market-oriented policies for 
economic development. They believe that such policies will help promote rapid economic growth, 
remove poverty and bring inclusive development. However, it is observed that the cost of such policies 
has been very high; inequality (both at individual and regional level) has increased, ordinary people are 
displaced from their land and livelihood, and their fundamental citizenship rights are violated. Profit 
over people has become the state’s preferred model of growth and development. Given this, any 
organisation that opposes neo-liberal developmental policies is considered anti-national by the state. 
The current BJP government considers the ‘oppositional civil society’ an obstacle to the process of 
development and nation building. In a recent report, India’s Intelligence Bureau accused NGOs of 
‘reducing India’s GDP by a staggering 2 to 3 per cent per annum, by campaigning against projects that 
the Indian government argued to be integral to economic growth’ (Doane, 2016). Considering this, the 
government has increased scrutiny of foreign funding to NGOs and it cancelled licences of around 
20,000 of 33,000 NGOs after they were found to be violating various provisions of the FCRA (The Times 
of India, 2016). Since then, the state has continued to use reporting requirements under the FCRA to 
curtail the activities of many NGOs. A recent Civicus report found that India’s civic space is obstructed. 
The ‘…obstructed category indicates that power holders contest civic space, undermine CSOs and 
constrain the fundamental civil society rights of association, peaceful assembly and expression’ (2017).  
All of this means that in the current moment, civil society organizations and other critics of the state are 
facing threats to their very existence.  
Uncivil society 
One of the peculiarities of civil society in India is the long existence of voluntary, cultural and welfare 
providing civic groups that are also closely aligned with violent, state power seeking organizations. 
Collectively, the group of organizations united by its adherence to Hindutva ideology is known as the 
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Sangh Parivar. The ideology is one that asserts Hindu supremacy within India, a particular version of 
Hindu-ness as defined by upper caste, patriarchal interests. The political wing of the Sangh is the 
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), which is the ruling party at the federal level. It includes dozens of groups 
that engage in education, health care provision, cultural programming, youth groups, women’s self-help 
organizing etc. In addition to this welfarist orientation, there are groups that engage in the production of 
religious provocations, vigilante justice, ritualized riots, and the general intimidation of minorities. 
Together the service providers and violent mobilizers work to support the political wing (Deo 2016).  
On the left, there are also armed Naxalite groups that are aligned with Communist parties that also use 
a combination of welfare and violence to advance their aims. The influence and power of the right-wing 
Sangh Parivar is magnitudes greater than the Naxalites who are actually struggling on behalf of some of 
India’s most marginalised indigenous peoples (Roy, 2009).  
Blurred boundaries between state and civil society 
In India, many civil society organizations are closely linked to political parties, operating as their front 
organizations (Ray, 1999). Presently, the existence of uncivil society and its close ties to the political 
establishment, and therefore to the state, blurs the lines between civil society and the state. It also 
makes facile generalizations about civil society as a source for democratization or inclusion ring hollow. 
The clandestine nature of most election spending in India compromises political parties and makes them 
vulnerable to capture by corporate interests. But the boundaries between state and civil society are also 
blurred in other ways. CSOs may accommodate senior level bureaucrats in their organizational 
structures in order to leverage the state (Kumar, 2012). And some research also indicates that CSO 
relations with the state may highly depend on personal relations with political leaders. As these are 
often available to elite groupings and more disadvantaged ones, this may have important implications 
for inclusiveness (Harrison, 2017). Meanwhile, the government since 2013 requires corporations to 
donate part of their profits to social welfare further blurring the lines between civil society, the market, 
and the state.  
 
Concrete engagements between state and civil society 
 
Over the years, civil society In India has fulfilled various roles. For a part, the state has opened up to 
increased involvement and voice of groups in society9, to help establish a more participatory democracy. 
Most of the civil society’s efforts in the development sector have been in the wake of the state being 
viewed as inefficient and corrupt (Berglund, 2009), and the failure of government and market combined 
(Shah, 2014). As argued above, civil society actors have taken it upon themselves the responsibility to 
carry out development work such as setting up and running schools and hospitals, and running 
livelihood and capacity building programs. Shah (2014) calls this phenomenon a chhoti sarkar (mini-
government) since a lot of the service delivery work meant to be fulfilled by the government gets carried 
                                                 
9 Examples of this can be the 73rd and 74th Constitutional Amendment Act for decentralised rural and urban government 
structures established in 1992. 
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out by the CSO actors. Meanwhile, the Government of India has been acknowledging civil society’s role, 
accepting that the extent of problems in development sector is too large for a single delivery system and 
hence has acknowledged the partnership of the civil society (GoI, 2007:9). 
It is in this context that we may suggest that the state is not actually incapable but perhaps strategic, in 
allowing other agencies to carry out its work, without taking full responsibility of the citizens, or civil 
society agencies. Randeria (2003, 2007, 2009) describes this concept as ‘cunning state’ where ‘the state 
capitalizes on its perceived weakness in order to render themselves unaccountable both to the citizens 
and to the international (or other) institutions’ (Randeria, 2007). She also elaborates on this concept 
taking various examples of the Indian state and its interaction with international agencies such as the 
International Monetary Fund and the United Nations and argues that a cunning state will actually 
strategise its ‘presumed (in)capacities’ (Randeria, 2009) to get out of situations that it does not want to 
directly tackle. Hence, when the state is perceived to be weak by the citizens, civil society actors or the 
international community, the state itself may view this as an opportunity to ‘let go’ of some of its 
responsibilities. 
 
However, there are other observations to be considered here: first, the NGOs and other civil society 
actors are seen as committed and efficient, which seems to be more of an ideological view rather than 
an accurate description of the reality since this encompasses a wide range of actors and organizations 
working on diverse issues (Mercer, 2002); second, that the state is perceived as incapable/or lacking the 
capacity to carry out its work, which again may not be a depiction of reality (Randeria, 2009); and third, 
increased role of CSOs may lead to an increased dependence of the citizens on the organisations who 
are not as accountable as an elected government is (Shah, 2014).  
Between the two extremes of inefficiency of the state, which opens up space for the working of civil 
society, on one hand, to the overpowering state, which controls the civil society activities and funds 
through strict laws, there are a range of partnerships which the state and civil society enter into with 
each other. Examples of government-civil society partnership can be seen in areas of knowledge-sharing 
and knowledge-transfer, in policy implementation, and even on economic grounds which involve 
funding of services, partnership in building infrastructure etc.  
The Planning Commission of Government of India, in 2007, brought out a National Policy on the 
Voluntary Sector which outlines the types of partnerships which the government recognizes in relation 
to the CSOs: i) consultation- which could be a formal process of interaction at the Centre, State and 
District level, ii) strategic collaboration- so that sustained social mobilisation can be carried out over a 
long period of time, and iii) funding- of project through standard schemes. The government ensures that 
these partnerships will be given space in the annual Plans prepared by ministers and different state 
agencies (Planning Commission, 2007). The government also showed its openness to collaborate by 
bringing in the expertise of the voluntary sector in advisory panels, task forces and committees, on 
important issues. An example of this can be the Anti-Corruption Movement led by Anna Hazare which 
subsequently led to the formation of a statutory committee for the Jan Lokpal Bill in 2012.  
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Another example of state collaboration with the CSOs and other Civil Society actors such as 
academicians in India was through the erstwhile Planning Commission, for ground-level evaluation of an 
existing five-year plan and setting the priorities for subsequent ones. The state would encourage 
research findings from case studies, and also have consultations with civil society organizations working 
in the area. By inviting state and department level officials to be a part of these workshops and 
conferences (instead of just submitting a report of the findings) the civil society and state brokered 
space for each other in their respective domains. Evidence of state-civil society partnership also 
supports that certain political regimes and certain individuals working in the state or local level 
institutions would look to civil society favourably (Goswami and Tandon, 2013). Moreover, at the local 
levels of governance, the space for civil society intervention can also be supported by political party 
workers, which form easy access points for civil society to make their voices heard (Harris, 2007).  
However, this opening up of the state has been conditional and partial. Ganguly (2015) states that the 
state’s ‘invited spaces’ have often been tokenistic in the space for civil society influence they have 
provided, whereas ‘invented spaces’ where CSOs claim space for their voice have been more influential. 
Kumar (2012) and Ganguly (2015) argue that state actors have been more open to CSOs able to draw on 
their past experience and legitimacy connected with working at the grassroots level and speaking with 
knowledge of ground realities, in support or opposition to a policy. For example, in the state of 
Karnataka in India, MYRADA’s (Mysore Resettlement and Development Agency) work on Self-Help 
Groups led to the government’s up-scaling of it to the state and national level (Kumar, 2012). Relatedly, 
Ganguly (2015) claims that movements, having a clear social basis, representing marginal groupings in 
particular, can more easily than (professional) NGOs obtain legitimacy in the eyes of the state, which in 
turn can contribute to influence.  
Over the years, certain civil society organizations and actors have also been able to make their voices 
heard by the state through protests and organized movements involving worker unions, citizens etc. The 
Mazdoor Kisaan Shakti Sangathan (MKSS) whose protests and continuous campaigns led to the draft and 
acceptance of Right to Information Act 2005 and eventually the National Rural Employment Guarantee 
Act in the same year, is one such example. Citizen and CSOs alike protested against the rape and 
eventual death of Jyoti Singh in December 2012 (Nirbhaya Case) which led to stricter laws being framed 
by the courts and ordinances passed by the Union Cabinet against rapists. At the same time, the Indian 
state imposes limits on the space and role for such protest activity. Civil society may be subject to a lot 
of scrutiny before being accepted by the state. Though it looks like the civil society encompasses a large 
area of our everyday lives, in reality, there are only certain policy spaces open for intervention by civil 
society. As we have seen above, certain regimes may be more open than others for civil society 
intervention. Within that space, there may be certain issues where civil society may intervene (such as 
microfinance for women or watershed management) while certain others are out of bounds, such as 
defence, law and order and national security (Kumar, 2012). Further, there are particular departments 
and individuals who may be more willing to collaborate with civil society actors and this also is an area 
of state-civil society negotiations. We also need to stress here that the state is not a singular institution, 
but a collection of different (types of) organizations, working in highly diverging contexts and at 
different levels.  
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As we attempt to draw this picture of the Indian state’s engagement with civil society, we need to add 
here that empirical studies on the Indian state’s engagement with CSOs have been scattered and few, 
with limited empirical basis to cover massive ground. The picture we obtain from this review is 
fragmented, leaving questions as to how to understand the complexity we find.  
 
Implications for our research: a complex picture 
 
This chapter shows that the state and civil society relationship in India has undergone tremendous 
transformation. While at some times civil society has become partners of the state in development, at 
other times it is perceived by the state as a hindrance to economic development and nation-building 
process. Presently, the picture of the Indian state’s engagement with civil society is complex. State’s 
relationship with civil society is diverse. Partly, boundaries between state and civil society are blurred. 
When it comes to CSOs operating in relative autonomy from the state, the state’s openness can depend 
on topic but also on other criteria such as expertise and the capacity to contribute to development 
objectives shared by state and civil society. In recent years, surveillance and curtailing of civil society 
activity has increased, with special attention to the role of foreign funding. At the same time, state 
sensitivity to public protest, widely and commonly undertaken, with regard to different policy domains, 
can also be identified.  
In India the state shows complex engagement with, and disengagement from, a diverse civil society. 
Faced with a limited set of empirical works to draw on, we lack understanding of the patterning of the 
ways state agents conceive of the representative role of civil society and the different types of CSOs that 
are part of this. When we ask basic questions like: ‘which CSOs matter to the state, and why?’ or ‘what 
can the role of CSOs be for the state, and how ‘political can this role be?’ or ‘how does CSO collaboration 
matter?’ we do not know if we will find shared understandings across state actors, or if these are so 
diverse that they are contingent in unforeseeable ways. With the mixed information from the literature, 
we also do not know what implications there are of such conceptions for the inclusiveness of the state’s 
engagement with civil society. Comparatively considering the policy domains of women’s rights and 
disaster risk reduction, we plan to draw on this chapter to inform our research of:  
1. The patterns in the ways state actors conceive of the representative role of civil society as such.  
2. To what extent and in what ways state actors distinguish between CSOs/CSO collaborations when it 
comes to their representative roles, and what relevant diversities come in. 
3. What considerations come in for state actors when it comes to decisions to engage or not with 
specific CSOs/CSO collaborations that seek a representative role.  
4. What informs state actors’ understandings and engagement with CSOs/CSO collaborations.  
5. The way considerations of the state’s perceptions of civil society and CSOs come in in the way CSOs 
give shape to their representative roles.  
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6. How the above implicates the inclusiveness of the Indian state’s engagement with CSOs.  
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Chapter 6. Composition of civil society in India 
 
Introduction 
 
Civil society is considered crucial for the survival and sustenance of democracy in any society. However, 
it should be noted that civil society is not a monolithic category, and its contributions to inclusive and 
sustainable development and democratization are contingent upon its nature and composition. The 
Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) supports civil society “based on the principle that a diverse and 
pluralist civil society is both goal in itself and a means to an end as it is crucial for sustainable and 
inclusive development”(Kamstra, 2017: 1). Therefore, charting out the relevant diversities of civil society 
and their representative roles through this research in the Indian context would provide crucial 
information for shaping policies regarding civil society’s engagement in sustainable and inclusive 
development.  
 Kamstra (2017: 11) argues that ‘not all CSOs are forces for good, that civil society should not be equated 
with professional NGOs, and that a more diverse set of CSOs should be included which is better 
connected to local constituencies and local concerns. Taking a cue from this, this chapter takes stock of 
present research identifying relevant diversities of Indian civil society. The review also brings out some 
indications regarding forms of CSOs that contribute to inclusiveness of vulnerable and marginalized 
sections of society, and forms that work against it, as identified in existing research on Indian civil 
society.  
Acknowledging the relevance of examining the essentially dynamic and pluralistic nature of civil society 
space, this research seeks to explore the various typologies of CSOs through which diversity and plurality 
of civil space is understood in the Indian context. The various typologies of CSOs and their contributions 
to inclusive and sustainable development is explored below. Subsequently, we present an analysis of the 
typologies, and discuss how we will draw on this review in our research.  
 
Specificity of civil society diversity  
 
In international development, the importance of differentiating between different types of CSO has 
been emphasized, because of their different contributions to advancing empowerment, social justice, 
and inclusive developmental change. For example, in Banks et al. (2015), the need for differentiating 
between NGOs and member-based organizations (MBOs), is suggested because they are influenced to a 
variable extent by the politics of development. MBOs, such as social movements, political or religious 
institutions, trade unions, cooperatives, small SHGs, and campaigning groups, are viewed as political 
(Chen et al. 2007). MBOs aim to negotiate improved terms of recognition, and advance interests of the 
groups they are representing. In this process of negotiation, they often challenge the state and other 
vested interests and therefore are viewed as ‘political’. In contrast, institutionalized NGOs face 
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regulatory challenges – the state tries to either coopt them or make them depoliticized so that they are 
unable to pose any challenge to state power. In particular, state actively monitors and scrutinizes 
externally financed NGOs, their political motives, and activities, for they might undermine state’s 
development strategy (Sen, 1999; Jalali, 2013). However, going beyond such typologies, we survey the 
specificity of civil society diversity as it emerges in the Indian context, and examine the relevance of this 
context-specific diversity for inclusive development by supporting the representative role of civil society, 
such as Dialogue and Dissent.  
Civil society is broad and diverse in India, and has expanded significantly over past decades. There were 
1.2 million voluntary organizations working on development issues in 2004, increasing to 3.1 million 
according to recent data (Srivastava and Tandon 2005; Sahoo, 2017; Tandon, 2017). The majority of 
them (58.7%) are engaged in development in rural areas. Many of them (49.6%) are not registered 
under any act (Government of India, 2012). 10 Social services (41%); environment, law, advocacy, and 
other issues (19%); culture and recreation (12%); education and research (9%); unions (7%); 
development and housing (5%); religion (5%); and health (2%) emerged as the important issues on 
which the registered organizations work on (Government of India, 2012; Sahoo, 2017). To gain deeper 
insight into its diversity, we can explore the composition of civil society in India through different 
typologies that scholars of Indian civil society have developed. 
Typologies 
Civil society scholars have developed different typologies to describe the nature and composition of civil 
society in India. While some have developed dichotomous typologies, others perceive a dichotomous 
typology as too simplistic to capture the diversity, and hence have developed more detailed 
classifications. To illustrate, typologies presented in VANI (2017) and Sahoo (2013) are on constraining 
or enabling economic development, and democratic development, respectively. Tandon’s (2001) 
classification differentiates between different kinds of associations. Shah’s (2014) classification is based 
on their motivations, strategies, inclinations and differential contributions to social transformation. 
Some have classified one kind of CSOs into further sub-types, for example, Rajasekhar’s (2003) 
classification of NGOs, Mitra’s (2017) classification of social movements, and Sahoo (2017) classification 
of counter- (social) movements based on intent. 
VANI, an Apex body of voluntary organizations in India, broadly classifies CSOs into – (1) rights-based or 
mobilization organizations, and (2) development organizations (VANI: 2017). As they show, rights-based 
or mobilization organizations have been scrutinized by the Indian state because the state perceives 
them as creating obstacles to economic development. In contrast, the state considers that development 
organizations contribute significantly to economic development by influencing policies (idem).  
                                                 
10 CSOs in India are registered under the following acts: 
1. Societies Registration Act (1860);  
2. The Indian Trusts Act (1882); 
3. The Public Trust Act (1950);  
4. The Charitable and Religious Trust Act (1920);  
5. The Wakf Act (1995); and  
6. The Indian Companies Act (1956), revised in The Indian Companies Act (2012) 
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Sahoo (2013) argues that the dominant perception in the civil society literature is that there are two 
kinds of civil society groups - (1) traditional organizations related to religion, culture, and identity, and 
(2) secular ones working on issues related to development, empowerment, and rights. This distinction is 
made by civil society scholars primarily to argue that the former undermines democratic development 
and the latter deepens it. Sahoo questions this assumption and argues that this may not always be 
correct. Considering this, he advocates for a contingency theory of civil society and democratic 
development.  
Tandon (2001), and Tandon and Mohanty (2002) have classified civil society into five kinds of 
associations, which has been adopted by Government of India (2012) in its policy documents. While we 
find that in some respects the categorizations can be questioned in terms of conceptual clarity and 
justification, we include this categorization here because of its uptake by the Indian state and other 
actors. The associations are of the following types:  
(1) Traditional associations based on identity and social unit such as tribe, ethnicity, or caste. They have 
characteristics of voluntary associations, because their membership is not purely ascriptive. This is 
because birth into the caste is necessary but not a sufficient condition for membership. To be a part of 
the association, one has to join as a member (Rudolph and Rudolph, 1960, 1967, 2008). In the context of 
India, Beteille (2012, 2013) suggests that caste has played an essential part in the advancement of 
democracy because not only does the democracy change the social order; to some extent, it is also 
influenced by the social order.  
(2) Religious associations of different sects. They carry out social welfare activities to improve public 
goods like education, healthcare and water supply.  
(3) Social movements, which engage in non-institutionalized collective political action to bring about 
social and/or political change. Their focus is on the interests and aspirations of particular under-
represented groups, such as the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, or women in India. They aim at 
achieving better governance, an anti-corruption society, or overturning the anti-people policies. They 
are considered to act as a major political force of lasting influence (Sengupta, 2014). For example, the 
ongoing anti-corruption movement at the national level initiated by Anna Hazare in 2011 (Goswami and 
Tandon, 2013; Lakhani, 2018; Sengupta, 2014; Shiva and Bandyopadhyay, 1986).  
(4) Membership associations are further classified into representational, professional, social–cultural, or 
SHGs. 
a) Representational associations are established to represent the perspectives and interests of a 
particular group, such as unions of rural laborers, farm workers, or women workers, or consumer 
associations. 
b) Professional associations are set up for a particular profession (e.g. associations of lawyers, 
teachers, engineers, managers, or journalists). 
c) Social–cultural associations are established for social or cultural activities, such as Nehru Yuvak 
Kendras (youth associations), clubs for sports, and Natak Mandalis (theatre groups). 
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d) SHGs are registered groups of micro-entrepreneurs and are a growing category in India as a result of 
the emphasis on financial inclusion of the most vulnerable and marginalized in policies of 
government, banks and international agencies. Women’s SHGs in particular have made a significant 
contribution in poverty alleviation and women empowerment. 
 
(5) Intermediary associations are known as advocacy associations and networks and they form a link 
between individuals (micro level) and state institutions (macro level). Development NGOs and advocacy 
networks such as the Right to Food Campaign are classified as intermediate associations. Some of them 
support social movements like the anti-POSCO movement in Odisha. This movement is an example of 
local resistance to land acquisition for a South Korean company POSCO to invest in the mining industry, 
and set up a steel plant, power plant and a port. The land use change would have affected self–
sustaining, local economy and a way of life of around 50,000 people. Further, the government has set up 
intermediate associations to implement their projects, for example, the National AIDS Control 
Organization was established by the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare.  
 
Besides these five kinds of associations, Goswami and Tandon (2013) have also added two more groups. 
They are: 
 
(6) Corporate-established foundations are a new kind of civil society organizations that were 
established under the revised Indian Companies Act (2012). The Act mandates allocation of 2% of 
companies’ net profits to corporate social responsibility (CSR). The corporations formed these 
foundations to implement CSR activities. 
(7) Community-Based Organizations (CBOs) are an important part of civil society in the context of 
inclusive development, representing local interests. They are voluntary and self-financed organizations. 
Recently, CBOs have come into prominence for carrying out citizen’s protests in urban centers. One of 
the most influential protests was Delhi gang-rape case in December 2012, which shaped the Nirbhaya11 
Act for women’s safety in 2013. 
Shah (2014), in his typology of civil society, has concentrated on the segments of civil society that claim 
to be acting in the larger public interest and seek to bring about social transformation. The rationale for 
focusing on these segments is that these have remained relatively unacknowledged in public, as they 
operate in spaces among the subalterns and away from the media publicity. Shah has classified these 
segments of civil society based on their motivations, strategies, inclinations and differential 
contributions to social transformation. The types he identifies in these terms are: 
Type A: Compassion and charity is the oldest form of civil society. It aims to reach out to the distressed 
to provide immediate relief, hence is engaged in short-term and remedial measures rather than aimed 
at addressing the root causes of suffering. 
Type B: Development NGOs have stepped in to address the gap in governance and efforts by the 
government to provide public goods such as drinking water, food security, health, and education, and 
                                                 
11 Nirbhaya means fearless. 
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protect the environment. They act as substitutes or in parallel to the state. Development NGOs face the 
same issues and inefficiencies as the government in expansion of the scale. Further, there is a concern of 
creating dependencies on development NGOs similar to the government. 
Type C: Rights-based activism takes a critical perspective on the mainstream practices of the 
government and the market. It is aimed at empowering vulnerable and marginalized groups through 
generating awareness about their rights. Rights-based activism is inspired by Amartya Sen’s pioneering 
work on agency, rights, and capabilities (e.g. Dreze and Sen, 2002). Rights-based activism is considered 
“counter-hegemonic,” following Gramsci, and has similarities with radical Marxism in India. The risk for 
these groups is that they might remain as marginal voices in the periphery and not have an influence on 
mainstream functions. 
Type D: Engaging the state and leveraging the market is the most recently developed form. Shah 
(2014:40) considers it to be the “most creative and effective type of civil society action in India.” These 
groups acknowledge that the state is the potential protector of and provider for vulnerable and 
marginalized people. They consider engaging with the state as instrumental to enhance accountability 
and transparency of the state by influencing its policies and functioning in favor of inclusion of the 
vulnerable and marginalized. They rely on the findings of rights-based activism groups to improve 
people’s access to the government resources intended for them in a time-bound manner.12 Further, 
they give relatively more attention to the issue of “representation” of the rights of the vulnerable and 
marginalized people than the rights-based activism (Type C). These groups have also initiated 
engagement with the market to enable collective action among poor, individual, small and marginal 
female farmers so that they can compete in the market. An example is The Federation of Women’s 
SHGs. 
Unlike development NGOs (Type B), Type D organizations consider the implementation of programs as 
the responsibility of local governing bodies such as the gram panchayats, and capacity building as the 
role of civil society. To illustrate, the National Consortium of Civil Society Organizations engages in 
building the state’s capacities for effective implementation of the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural 
Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA). 
Interestingly, according to this typology CSOs can transition from one type to another. For instance, 
Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan (MKSS) has transitioned from carrying out rights-based activism (Type 
C) since the 1990s to engaging the state and leveraging the market (Type D) from 2004 onwards. Long-
term engagement of MKSS with marginalized people in rural Rajasthan on the right to information, and 
of rural workers to basic entitlements built their legitimacy to engage with the state. This has involved 
contributions to formulation of pro-poor interventions and legislation, and inclusion in the Directorate 
of Social Audit by the government of Andhra Pradesh. 
                                                 
12 For instance, the government of India allocated INR 700.000 crore (7.000.000.000.000) in the 11th Five Year Plan (2007–2012) 
and INR 200.000 crore (2.000.000.000.000) in the 12th Five Year Plan (2012–2017) for social and economic inclusion.  
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The next typology is of NGOs based on their function proposed by Rajasekhar (2003). There are further 
distinctions within the types, depending on the organization’s primary activity. 
(1) Operational or grassroots NGOs are local organizations operating in a single or multiple 
locations. They specialize in directly engaging with the marginalized. The sub-types are : 
a) Charity and welfare NGOs primarily carry out charitable activities (distribution of food, 
clothes, and medicines); welfare activities (creating education, healthcare and drinking 
water facilities); relief activities (in case of disasters like droughts, floods, and 
earthquakes, and displaced people); and rehabilitation activities (in areas where the 
hazard occurred). This category includes church-based NGOs functioning in North-
eastern and Southern India. 
b) Development NGOs are engaged in basic provisions for enhancing socio-economic 
development of vulnerable and marginalized people by sustaining their livelihoods. 
c) Social action groups are oriented toward mobilizing marginalized and oppressed groups 
on issues of inequality and the concentration of power and resources in the hands of 
few. They adopt different strategies to raise awareness, participatory approach to 
identify priorities. Young India Project is a social action group in Andhra Pradesh, which 
has been mobilizing agricultural laborers since 1981 (through protest marches and 
dharnas13), demanded effective implementation of land reforms and MGNREGA. 
d) Empowerment NGOs combine development activities with issue-based struggles. They 
carry out the role of service provider to bring about the social, economic, political, and 
cultural empowerment of the poor. For instance, Mysore Resettlement and 
Development Agency (Myrada) uses credit management groups and watershed 
programs for social and political empowerment. Grama uses savings and credit activity 
as the entry point into the community. Grama then educates people and enables them 
to access the government resources intended for them, participate in gram panchayats, 
and identify priority issues. 
The charity and welfare NGOs and the development NGOs primarily carry out the role of 
service delivery. These types of NGOs are considered apolitical in contrast to the social 
action groups and the empowerment NGOs. This is because social action groups and 
empowerment NGOs aim to raise social and political consciousness among the 
disadvantaged groups. The key difference between social action group and empowerment 
NGOs lies in their objective and whether they engage in development activities. While social 
action groups target the root cause of poverty rather than carrying out development 
activities, empowerment NGOs integrate empowerment as a key aspect in their 
developmental activities. 
(2) Support NGOs primarily strengthen the capacities of grassroots NGOs, panchayat raj 
institutions, and cooperatives to enhance effectiveness of their functions through training 
programs. SOSVA and SEARCH are examples of support NGOs. 
                                                 
13 Dharnas are a way of showing disagreement with something by refusing to leave a place. 
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(3) Umbrella or network NGOs are either formal associations or informal groups of grassroots 
and/or support NGOs that meet regularly on addressing common concerns. They act as a forum 
for sharing experiences and carrying out joint development activities, and engage in lobbying 
and advocacy as a network. 
(4) Funding NGOs are supported by foreign sources and self-generated funds raised within India to 
finance grassroots, and support NGOs. Dorabji Tata Trust, the Aga Khan Foundation, and CRY 
generate funds within India, while the Netherlands International Development Cooperation, 
ActionAid, and Oxfam are foreign funding agencies which carry out pro-poor rural development 
activities in India. 
Mitra (2017) has developed a typology of civil society activism. The typology is presented as a matrix of 
core values and the spatial scale (Table 1). 
Table 1: Typology of civil society activism 
Level Core Values 
Material/Secular Identity/Religion 
Local/Regional Type 1 Type 3 
Telangana Statehood 
Movement 
Khalistan Movement 
National Type 2 Type 4 
Anna Hazare Movement Hindu Nationalists 
 
For Mitra (2017), the consequences of civil society activism for democratization hinges on - 1) intensity, 
referring to the importance that core activists attach to their shared goal; 2) scale, or the geographical 
spread of the supporting community to the activists; and 3) the response of the state. Mitra argues that 
civil society has opened up alternative routes to channelize criticism of development pathways, 
informing policies in a constructive way. If these alternative routes had not opened up, then the 
criticism might have resulted in extreme steps and violence. Mitra (2017) argues that this is why the 
Indian state has supported this form of civil society activism through laws like the Right to Information 
Act (2005).  
Sahoo (2017) has classified the counter-(social) movements that emerged in different parts of India. 
Following Polanyi, Sahoo argues that these movements are a response to the adverse effects of neo-
liberal capitalism, such as social dislocations created by economic changes. The movements cannot 
always be considered as anti-state or anti-market, and they are mainly important reflections of the 
heterogeneous interests of the vulnerable and marginalized (Kothari, 1984; Levien, 2007; Sahoo, 2017). 
Different methods have been adopted for different types of counter-movements, ranging from non-
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violent Gandhian Satyagraha14 to violent armed Naxalite struggles to protect and advance the interests 
of the poor. 
(1) Reactionary counter-movements emerged to resist exploitative and exclusivist neo-liberal 
policies and the eventual dispossession of the indigenous people. With the enactment of the 
Special Economic Zone Act in 2005, several state governments have been pursuing neo-liberal 
policies and facilitating land acquisition for private capital. In response, farmers have stirred up 
reactionary counter-movements in the form of anti-dispossession protests in Odisha (Kalinga 
Nagar, Tata; Niyamgiri, Vedanta; and Jagatsinghpur, POSCO), West Bengal (Singur and 
Nandigram), Uttar Pradesh (Bhatta Parsauul), Gujarat (Save Narmada), and Rajasthan (Mahindra 
World City). These counter-movements have transcended class boundaries and have created a 
“pluralistic coalition.”  
 
(2) Reformist counter-movements are influenced by the rights-based approach and work on issues 
of equitable and distributive justice for the poor, who are adversely affected by the globalizing 
economy. These movements are non-violent political mobilization of “counter-hegemonic” 
forces and are not only intended to engage with the state regarding unequal power relations, 
but also to enhance the accountability of the state in terms of the interests of the vulnerable 
and marginalized. These movements are advanced by various advocacy groups (e.g. NGOs, and 
social movements) to contribute to inclusive development. The right to food, the right to 
information, the right to education, and the right to employment for marginalized groups are 
reformist counter-movements. They were initiated by poor peasants, tribes, and labourers, and 
supported by middle-class activists and progressive officials from within the government and 
bureaucracy. 
 
(3) Welfarist/developmental counter-movements are based on the perception that the state is 
“minimalist” in nature and must be complemented. Therefore, the welfarists collaborate with 
the state and act as “public service contractors”. NGOs and development organizations are 
involved in these movements. In contrast to the reformists, welfarists adopt a depoliticized and 
technocratic approach.  
 
(4) Political counter-movements are intended to enhance participation of the vulnerable and 
marginalized groups in formal politics. Civil society scholars argue that the incentives provided 
by the political parties to mobilize the poor for higher political participation do little to solve the 
problems of poor people. Therefore, the poor actively use civil society space to solve their 
problems instead of political parties. Harriss’ (2005) findings suggest that poor people 
participate relatively actively in the political process.  
The above discussion shows that the nature and composition of civil society in India is very diverse; it is 
not a monolithic category. It includes organizations ranging from relief and welfare, and traditional 
                                                 
14 Satyagraha means “insistence on truth” and refers to a particular form of non-violent resistance or civil resistance initiated 
by Mahatma Gandhi. 
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ethno-religious kinds to secular, developmental and rights-based ones. While some of them are highly 
politicized and engage with the state actively, others prefer to remain apolitical or/and are coopted by 
the state. Given this inherent diversity and pluralism of civil society in India, it difficult to make any 
generalizations regarding civil society’s contribution towards inclusive and sustainable development. 
Considering this, we argue that while some CSOs may positively influence developmental policy, others 
may not. In order thus to provide a better explanation, we argue, it is important to understand the local 
“contextual diversity” of civil society organizations and examine their implications differently.  
  
Implications for our research: relevant diversities 
 
We undertook this review based on the starting point that deepening our understanding of the 
representative role of civil society and the ways collaboration can support this, requires an 
understanding of locally relevant diversities of civil society. The pluralistic nature of civil society is 
evident from the spectrum of civil society ranging from caste and professional membership associations 
to self-help groups and from social action groups seeking to empower marginalized communities to 
reactionary counter-movements. Contemporary civil society in India clearly complex and 
heterogeneous, with its potentially relevant diversities going much beyond the distinctions discussed in 
the Dialogue and Dissent Theory of Change (2017:38). Our review of the existing typologies of Indian 
civil society insights leads us to conclude that the importance of this diversity presents itself in multiple 
ways.  
 
First of all, we see that in the Indian context, many different typologies of civil society can be seen as 
relevant to understanding and researching inclusive development, depending on the theoretical 
perspective taken, or the dimensions that are emphasized – see also the chart at the end of this chapter. 
Different typologies overlap, while some present mutually exclusive understandings. There is no single 
‘best’ typology by which our study of the way relevant diversities of civil society shape representative 
roles, can be approached.  
 
Secondly, it is clear that a wide range of types can have significant implications for inclusive 
development. In different ways, diversities as presented in different typologies implicate inclusiveness in 
important ways – by the standing and role accorded to different types, by the motivations, cultural and 
ideological basis of different types, and by the political processes in which they are involved. Also 
relevant here is that types show differentiated relating to local constituencies and concerns, as well as 
marginalized and vulnerable sections of Indian society. Particularly relevant in this regard seem to be 
membership associations (Tandon 2001, 2002; Government of India, 2012); rights-based organizations, 
and organizations that engage the state and leverage the market (Shah, 2014); grassroots CSOs, 
developmental NGOs, social action groups (Rajasekhar, 2003); and reformist and political counter-
(social) movements (Sahoo, 2017). This implies that in the Indian context, different types of civil society 
organization can have highly diverging representative roles, with important implications for 
development efforts.  
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Thirdly, we see that typologies, while often based in broad and abstract distinctions, are often also at 
least partly rooted in context-specific cultural, social and political conditions and histories. This implies 
that knowledge and analysis of such contextual dimensions, rather than (only) abstract notions of CSOs 
and their roles should inform collaborations and support policies such as Dialogue and Dissent. Our 
project will be informed by this realization, and will consider how insights on this matter can realistically 
inform future policy. 
In our project, we take the starting point that we need to explore the ways in which CSOs situated in the 
South shape their representative role in relation to their environment, embedded in relations and 
collaborations. This review sheds light on the potential roles of relevant diversities in the Indian context 
that likely matter in the shaping of representative roles. We plan to draw on this review of typologies to 
help inform our research of: 
1. The way different types of CSOs in India construct their representative roles, and whether and how 
this diversity implicates this role in ways that are important for advancing inclusive development. 
2. The way different types of CSOs in India make distinctions between different types of CSO in the 
domain in which they work, and how this informs collaboration with other CSOs. What differences 
matter, and why? For what collaborative purposes?  
3. The way Indian state actors that are targeted by CSOs in the context of development make 
distinctions between different types of CSO in the domain in which they work, and how this informs 
collaboration with CSOs. What differences matter, and why? How does this shape state engagement 
with civil society?  
4. The way these diversities implicate inclusiveness – how do distinctions that civil society and state 
actors work with shape the inclusiveness of civil society’s roles in development ? 
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Typology of civil society 
based on the characterisitc of 
enabling or constraining 
economic  development
VANI (2017)
Rights based or 
mobilization
Developmental
Typology ofcivil society based 
on the characterisitc of 
enabling or constraining 
democratic development 
Sahoo (2013)
Traditional (related 
to religion, culture, 
and identity)
Secular working on 
issue of development 
, empowerment and 
rights
Typology of civil society based 
on type of association
Tandon (2001,2002), cited in 
Government of India (2012); 
Tandon & Goswami (2013)*
Traditional 
associations
Religious associations
Social movemements
Membership 
associations (SHG)
Intermediary 
organization
Corporate 
established 
foundations*
Community based 
Organizations*
Typology of civil society 
based on motivations, 
strategies, inclinations 
towards advancing social 
transformations
Shah (2014)
Compassion and 
charity
Developmental
Right-based activism
Engaging the state 
and leveraging the 
market 
Typology of NGOs based 
on their role in relation to 
each other
Rajasekhar (2003)
Operational and 
grassroot
Support
Umbrella network
Funding
Typology of social 
movements (civil society 
activism) based on core 
values/ scale 
Mitra (2017)
Material and secular/ 
local and regional 
scale
Material and secular/ 
national scale
Identity and religion 
based/ local and 
regional scale
Identity and religion 
based/ national scale
Typology of counter-(social) 
movements based on the 
intent
Sahoo (2017)
Reactionary
Reformist
Welfarist
Political
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Chapter 7. Conclusion: innovation and policy relevance 
 
Innovation 
 
Collaboration between CSOs has been widely studied. Our review brought out many ways in which 
collaboration between CSOs can enable and constrain them. However, our review also taught us that 
the study of enabling and constraining factors has rarely been done from the perspectives of 
Southern CSOs, and does not identify the ways in which these CSOs see, understand and navigate the 
possibilities of collaboration that they see. In particular, the relative role and potential contribution 
of different collaborations (international and domestic) to their role, as Southern CSOs understand 
these, has not been researched.  
Autonomy and ownership are commonly taken as fundamental to CSOs’ roles. In our review, we 
unpacked these concepts. We learnt that autonomy and ownership are likely best understood as 
relative in nature, as CSOs are commonly embedded in multiple relations and collaborations. We also 
learnt that we know little of the ways in which questions of autonomy and ownership actually 
emerge for Southern CSOs, and how they navigate issues that may emerge for them.  
In recent years, representation is being rethought, and this rethinking has shed light on the 
important role of non-electoral representation in many political and governance contexts, doing 
justice to the role of non-state actors representing interests, perspectives and causes. This literature 
offers important guidelines for understanding representation by CSOs. Notably, our team is among 
the first to take the study of non-electoral representation into the field of international development.  
We do this situating our study in the Indian context, and our literature of this context brought out 
the complexity of this context, as well as the wide diversity of Indian civil society, and the importance 
of both for the study of civil society’s representative roles.  
Considering the three theoretical debates we looked into, we see a remarkable research opportunity. 
There is a wide literature on the enabling and constraining role of collaborations between CSOs. 
There is also a wide recognition of CSO autonomy and ownership and the way collaborations can 
affect these. In development studies both themes have been addressed widely, and partly also 
connected. In political science and governance studies there is a wide acceptance of CSOs as non-
electoral representatives. However, these three debates and lines of research have never been 
connected. None of the representation literature addresses the way representation takes shape for 
CSOs embedded in multiple relations and collaborations that affect their autonomy and ownership. 
Little of the collaboration literature engages with representation, and certainly not the state of the 
art knowledge on non-electoral representation and how it is constructed. This is important 
considering the way we may expect collaboration, and autonomy and ownership issues may 
implicate the representation that is fundamental to CSOs’ roles.  
Our ambition is to bring out the dynamics between collaboration and representation, with a keen 
eye for implications for autonomy and ownership, as they unfold for CSOs that navigate their 
possibilities for shaping their representative roles in Indian settings. Importantly, we do so seeking to 
do justice to the diversity of CSOs. We also explore both CSOs and the state actors that these CSOs 
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target with their advocacy - CSOs’ shaping of their representative roles from their understandings, 
agendas and organizational backgrounds, and state actors’ understandings and engagement with 
these representations. We do this for the following reason: while the nature and diversity of CSO 
representation may greatly matter for the expression of people’s voices, it is in interaction with key 
targets like the state that we get to see how particular forms of representation may make a relevant 
difference for those who are addressed, find a hearing, and matter for development.  
Our ambition is to make the shaping of CSOs’ representative roles understandable; not just for the 
Indian context, but also beyond - to provide a realistic sense for how these roles develop for 
Southern CSOs, as agents.  
 
 
Policy relevance 
 
Through our research, we will contribute to policy relevant knowledge on the following fronts:  
1. Understanding the role of collaborations in CSOs’ representative roles from the 
perspective of CSOs in the Global South. This can help shape policy that takes Southern 
CSOs perspectives (on needs; on how collaboration can enable and strengthen) as a 
starting point. 
2. Understanding different representative roles, of diverse types of CSOs. This can help 
shape policy that takes into account the diversity of civil society organisations and the 
different forms of representation they engage in.  
3. Doing justice to the embeddedness of CSOs in collaborations and relations help develop 
more understanding of the ways questions of autonomy and ownership can emerge and 
shape representative roles.  
4. Understanding the way representative roles take shape in a context (complex civil 
society contexts; enabling and constricting political and administrative contexts) can help 
make policy do justice to this context, relating to what is ‘already going on’, and to what 
is possible. 
Furthermore, through our research, we plan to develop an analytical framework for donors and CSOs 
seeking to support the representative role of CSOs in the Global South from the ambition to 
strengthen the leading role of these Southern CSOs. Primarily, this framework will consist of a set of 
guiding questions that actors are to address, while shaping their collaborations with Southern CSOs, 
engaging with two key issues:  
1. What organisations to work with, from a recognition of locally relevant civil society 
diversities and their implications for organisations’ roles in advancing inclusive and 
sustainable development. This involves focused analysis of civil society in selected countries 
or regions, regarding civil society composition, forms of representation and organisations’ 
embeddedness in relations and context. Guiding ambition here is: selection of partners from 
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a properly informed analysis of how certain partners can contribute to inclusive and 
sustainable development in a certain setting.  
2. The form and relative role of different collaborations, considering locally relevant civil 
society diversities and complementarities, and the need to have Southern CSOs take a 
leading role in navigating their possibilities for collaboration. This involves participatory 
engagement with Southern CSOs and their perspectives on their roles and how diverse 
collaborations may contribute to their role in advancing inclusive and sustainable 
development. Guiding ambition here is: identification of forms of collaboration that give 
more space to the understandings and agendas of Southern partners.  
With this, we hope to provide helpful input for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding the following 
policy questions: What type(s) of CSOs should be supported to change power relations for achieving 
inclusive sustainable development and (gender) equality? How, and with whom, should CSOs 
collaborate? What kind of support do these organisations need from whom to fulfil their specific 
representative roles?  
While this framework can guide Northern CSOs in the rethinking and reshaping of their roles and 
collaborations to facilitate more Southern leadership, for donors like the Netherlands Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, this framework can guide the shaping of policy frameworks that can facilitate more 
Southern Leadership. For example, this framework can help shape: 
1. Guidelines for context analysis that does justice to the complexity of actually existing civil 
societies and their domestic settings. 
2. Space for the agendas of Southern CSOs. 
And drawing on 1 and 2: 
3. Theories of Change that make clear how certain forms of support of, and collaboration 
with certain types of Southern CSOs (by Northern CSOs and the donor itself), can contribute 
to inclusive and sustainable development. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
